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Reaffirming the Role of the Federal Courts: 
How the Sixties Provide 
Guidance for Immigration Reform 
Robbie Clarke∗
Immigration policy should be generous; it should be fair; it should be 
flexible.  With such a policy we can turn to the world, and to our own 
past, with clean hands and a clean conscience.  Such a policy would be 
but a reaffirmation of old principles. 
John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants (1964)1
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Introduction 
In 2009, fifty-eight percent of the United States judged immigration to 
be "a good thing for this country today."2  At the same time, half of the 
country believed that immigration rates should decrease.3  In 2007, seventy-
eight percent of the nation would allow for some type of a path to 
citizenship for undocumented immigrants.4  The same year, "Americans 
believe[d] that immigrants have tended to make crime, the economy, social 
and moral values, and job opportunities worse rather than better."5  These 
numbers characterize the classic ambivalence that has long defined U.S. 
immigration policy and which paralyze efforts at immigration reform 
today.6  Caught between being the fabled "nation of immigrants" and a 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Lymari Morales, Americans Return to Tougher Immigration Stance, GALLUP, Aug. 
5, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/122057/Americans-Return-Tougher-Immigration-
Stance.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 3. Id.
 4. Jeffrey M. Jones, Fewer Americans Favor Cutting Back Immigration, GALLUP,
July 10, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/108748/fewer-americans-favor-cutting-back-
immigration.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 5. Id.
 6. See MICHAEL C. LEMAY, U.S. Immigration Policy and Politics, in THE 
GATEKEEPERS:  COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY 1–2 (Michael LeMay ed., 1989) 
[hereinafter LEMAY, GATEKEEPERS] (portraying U.S. immigration policy as perpetually 
being caught between the opposing notions of immigrants as refreshing the national 
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highly developed and established nation, finding the middle ground has 
long proven challenging.7
Yet Congress managed to do so over half a century ago when it unified 
the immigration system with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
(INA),8 and then cleansed it of racial prejudice with the Immigration Act of 
1965 (1965 Amendments),9 creating the groundwork for our modern 
immigration structure.10  Following decades of racially-based immigration 
policy, the 1965 Amendments launched a new era of immigration in the 
United States, imbuing the immigration process with emerging nonracial 
norms.11  Coupled with legislation from 1961 that standardized judicial 
review of immigration hearings, the U.S. adopted a decidedly pro-
immigration stance.  The social and political transformations of the 1960s 
served as the backdrop for Congress’s actions, and many of these centered 
on newly-championed individual liberties and the government’s role in 
guaranteeing these rights.12  In corresponding form, the 1961 and 1965 
Amendments brought U.S. immigration policy closer to the traditional 
values so central to that decade which epitomize the relationship between 
individuals and government. 
                                                                                                                 
workforce and culture against immigrants as weakening the American economy and set of 
values). 
 7. See HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE 
UNDOCUMENTED:  AMBIVALENT LAWS, FURTIVE LIVES 9 (2001) ("More than any other 
dynamic, the story of immigration policy in the United States is a tale of ambivalence 
towards new arrivals.").  The author credits three factors for the nation’s current reservations 
about immigration:  "America’s ‘exclusionary impulse’ towards nonwhite 
immigrants . . . competing and conflicting claims of capital and labor market 
interests . . . [and] the paradox embodied in undocumented immigration whereby it is 
denounced on the one hand as a calamity and on the other hand has been permitted to 
continue."  Id.
 8. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 9. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).  
 10. See JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 60 (1999) ("The Immigration and Nationality Act . . . remains the 
foundation of U.S. immigration law,  although it has subsequently been amended numerous 
times.  Among the most far-reaching of those amendments, the 1965 Immigration Act, 
marked a sea change in U.S. immigration policy.").   
 11. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH:  IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS 2 (2004) [hereinafter JOHNSON, MYTH] (declaring that "Congress eliminated racial 
exclusions from the U.S. immigration laws in the heyday of the 1960s civil rights 
movement" and significantly changed the racial makeup of the immigrant population). 
 12. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:  OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 225 (2007) (describing the 1965 Amendments as a "dramatic centerpiece of the 
civil rights initiatives of the Johnson administration"). 
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However, as other legal developments from that era generally settled 
into familiar positions, immigration policy has remained uncertain.13  The 
changes to immigration law that took place during the 1960s, while 
establishing a basic structure for the immigration system, were followed by 
decades of subsequent legislation that reworked the components of that 
structure.14  From a contemporary perspective, the modifications can largely 
be described as an emphasis on enforcement measures and a reduction of 
judicial review.15  Despite these unending attempts at constructive 
immigration reform, the public continues its appeals for thorough reform.16
Nevertheless, such legislation has been elusive.17  This Note argues that the 
obstacle to meaningful reform is the narrow focus of Congress.  Assessing 
immigration policy strictly within the confines of the nation’s current 
circumstances will not provide a thorough understanding of our 
immigration system or how best to reform it.18  Instead, Congress should 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See JOHNSON, MYTH, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that efforts of racial integration, 
while not fully completed, became "a legally sanctioned and socially acceptable goal").  
More generally, following the progressive era of the 1960s, "not only legal but political 
constraints moderate the majority’s treatment of domestic minorities."  Id. at 5 (emphasis 
added). 
 14. See infra, note 15 (explaining the types of changes made to the original 
immigration system). 
 15. See MICHAEL C. LEMAY, ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC POLICY:  THE REFORM OF 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW 14–27, 51 (1994) [hereinafter LEMAY,
ANATOMY] (explaining that the rise of the noncitizen population of the 1970s led to passage 
of mildly restrictionist legislation in the 1980s); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE 
FLOODGATES:  WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 48–
49 (2007) [hereinafter JOHNSON, FLOODGATES] (describing the increased immigration 
enforcement efforts of the 1990s through border controls and tighter legislation); 
KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 229–30 (discussing the legislation of the last twenty years 
which limits the involvement of federal courts in immigration adjudication). 
 16. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 25–27 (observing the increased rates of 
public discontent with immigration policy and ensuing calls for reform during the 1970s and 
1980s); ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR:  AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 
AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 220 (2004) (referring to widely publicized events involving 
noncitizens as well as general economic troubles to explain the reemergence of immigration 
policy as a target of reform). 
 17. See, e.g., Katherine L. Vaughns, Restoring the Rule of Law:  Reflections on Fixing 
the Immigration System and Exploring Failed Policy Choices, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 151, 185 (2005) (claiming that the potential for effective 
immigration policies existed following the 1965 Amendments but that the opportunity 
passed due to various shortcomings in subsequent legislation). 
 18. See JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 54 (explaining that the infrastructure 
of modern immigration law was created in 1952 with the INA, and "has been amended 
almost annually since its passage in 1952 . . . ").  In addition, the subsequent history of those 
amendments has hardly been consistent, veering from "humane and generous" to "harsher, 
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begin with a broader view and then approach reform considering the 
motivations that originally created the modern immigration system.  This 
method will then be applied specifically to removal hearings in the federal 
immigration courts and the constitutionally insufficient allowances for 
habeas corpus review on appeals from those hearings.  The benefits of such 
judicial review will then be evaluated by comparing immigration reform to 
the criminal procedure revolution that took place in the U.S. court system.  
The reaffirmation of the role of the federal courts in immigration through a 
restoration of judicial review should be part of the realignment of the 
nation’s immigration laws.  This inclusion of the judiciary would bring the 
nation’s immigration laws closer to their original motivations and would 
provide stability in immigration. 
I.  Past Immigration Reforms—Establishment of the Immigration System 
and Subsequent Changes 
Ever since the federal government earnestly began implementing a 
coherent national immigration policy in the 1880s,19 the domain has been 
one of its most volatile areas of law.20  This constant tendency towards 
revision stems in large part from the chronic bipolarity of national public 
opinion towards immigration and from recurring economic and societal 
concerns.21  Nevertheless, the United States has a long, if not complicated, 
relationship with noncitizens, and any evaluation of immigration policy 
carried out by a reform-minded nation should include not only present 
                                                                                                                 
less forgiving, and more insulated from judicial review."  KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 
225–26. 
 19. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 44–51 (1996) (tracking the development of federal 
immigration regulation during the beginning of the nineteenth century and through to the 
realization of this authority at the end of that century). 
 20. See LEMAY, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 6, at 1–5 (describing the cyclical nature of 
immigration policy, which reacts to past social, economic, and population concerns while 
simultaneously affecting these factors so as to set the stage for the next change in 
immigration policy); JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 45 ("U.S. immigration law is 
famous for its cyclical, turbulent, and ambivalent nature."). 
 21. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Conference Paper, America’s Schizophrenic 
Immigration Policy:  Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 758 (2000) ("America’s 
enthusiasm for newcomers has historically been tempered by its skeptical view of outsiders 
of different race, ethnicity, economic status, religion, or political affiliation."). 
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circumstances but also a wider fidelity to and understanding of the 
country’s unparalleled immigration history.22
A.  Congress’s Plenary Powers 
The history of immigration must begin with Congress, because 
under the accepted interpretation of Congress’s constitutional 
authority,23 the legislative branch maintains essentially plenary control 
over immigration policy choices.24  This dominion not only includes the 
ordinary power of Congress to legislate but also considerable autonomy 
from the Constitution itself in fashioning these laws:  "[O]ver no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete 
than it is over [immigration policy]."25  Immigration policy is then 
principally a creature of politics, and it is this freedom from the sturdier 
foundations of the Constitution that has given this area such 
uncertainty.26  Thus, any consideration of U.S. immigration policy is 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See ESMOND WRIGHT, THE AMERICAN DREAM:  FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO 
REAGAN 544–48 (1996) (illustrating briefly the history of U.S. immigration before 
concluding that "[t]he American immigration situation is unprecedented in world history").  
The author continues:  "To anyone who knows something of the history of nation-states in 
Europe, it is obviously no more possible to change the ethnic content of a polity without fear 
of consequence than to replace abruptly all the blood in a human body.  Yet this is the 
experiment upon which America has embarked."  Id. at 548. 
 23. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 11–12 (4th ed. 
1994) (listing an amalgamation of enumerated constitutional powers and implied rights of 
sovereignty that together form the federal power over immigration). 
 24. See, e.g., FRANK L. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (2d 
ed. 1961) (stating the foundational principle that Congress has the constitutional authority to 
regulate immigration without judicial oversight into compliance with the Constitution, which 
has also been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court). 
 25. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).  See also
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY:  LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN 
AND AMERICA 178–80 (1987) [hereinafter LEGOMSKY, JUDICIARY] (introducing the plenary 
power over immigration, shared between the Legislative and Executive branches, which "the 
[Supreme] Court has explicitly treated as an exception to the principle of constitutional 
review"); see also VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED:  IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 9–23 (2005) (attributing the nominal rights currently held by 
noncitizens to the growth of the plenary power doctrine).  But see JOHNSON, MYTH, supra
note 11, at 14, 17–18 (describing briefly the history of challenges to the plenary power 
doctrine and contending that it is an anachronistic approach in contemporary jurisprudence). 
 26. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1 (1984) ("In a legal firmament transformed by revolutions in due process and equal 
protection doctrine and by a new conception of judicial role, immigration law remains the 
realm in which government authority is at the zenith, and individual entitlement is at the 
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inherently an examination of Congress and the political pressures that 
have come into play over the decades.27
Recent constraints placed by Congress on judicial review also 
invoke another instance of its plenary authorities:  the near-absolute 
power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.28  "[D]ramatically 
limiting the scope of the judiciary’s guaranteed institutional 
autonomy,"29 this capability to alter federal jurisdiction has allowed 
Congress to reduce the judiciary’s role in immigration adjudications.30
In addition to the judiciary’s lack of control, the executive branch has 
historically deferred to Congressional judgment for the boundaries of its 
enforcement powers, and for decades Congress has expanded on these 
powers.31  The sum total of this authority gives Congress the discretion 
to greatly empower the executive agencies to carry out immigration 
policy and simultaneously relegate the judiciary to a minimal level of 
participation.32
                                                                                                                 
nadir."). 
 27. See LEMAY, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 6, at 2–5 (partitioning the evolution of U.S. 
immigration policy into four general phases, with each new era clearly prompted by 
economic, social, political, and demographic changes). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be 
vested in on Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and 
establish.").  See also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (finding that Congress 
holds the power to control the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary).  The Supreme Court 
recognized this constitutional grant of power when it stated that "[j]urisdiction is power to 
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that 
of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause."  Id. at 514. 
 29. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE:  THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 31 (2006). 
 30. See Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls:  How Restrictions on Judicial Review 
and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 41–43 (2006–2007) [hereinafter Benson, Paper Dolls] (describing 
the efforts since 1996 to "reduce the quantity and quality of judicial review of administrative 
removal orders").
 31. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 482–83 (2009) (arguing that the Executive branch in theory possesses 
significant influence over immigration policy-making through selective enforcement but that 
in practice Congress has exercised control without objection). 
 32. See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future:  Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial 
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1411–19 (1997) (arguing that 
limits on judicial review over immigration matters will not give finality to Executive 
decisions but rather will increase the legal confusion as complex constitutional questions 
become more prevalent). 
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B.  The Beginning of the Modern Structure 
Under Congress’s direction, immigration policy in the U.S. reflected 
economic considerations and nativist fears throughout much of its history.33
During the nation’s early decades, the appetite for an abundant labor force 
was the primary force shaping immigration policy.34  Nevertheless, there 
were restrictions on criminals, slaves, the diseased, and the impoverished, 
thus initially establishing the U.S. as generally receptive towards 
immigrants though discretely selective.35  In piecemeal fashion, Congress 
then began codifying and widening these restrictions, creating blatantly 
racially discriminatory classifications during the twentieth century as 
nativist sentiments and post-Industrial Revolution economic concerns 
turned politically active.36  The push for racial limits on immigration 
ultimately produced the Immigration Act of 1924 and the notorious national 
origins quota system.37  Structured to favor those ethnicities already present 
in the country, the system "effectively ended immigration; cheap labor was 
no longer needed."38  The national origins quota remained in effect through 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See NEUMAN, supra note 19, at 19–43 (arguing that the state governments 
regulated discrete categories of immigration since colonial times, labeling the prevailing 
notion otherwise as an "open-borders myth"); Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. 
Immigration Law:  Prospects for Reform After "9/11?", 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 
322–23 (2003) (explaining that early state prohibitions on allowing any nonwhite person to 
become a U.S. citizen agreed with the overall harsh treatment of minorities within the 
nation’s borders). 
 34. See Boswell, supra note 33, at 324 (presenting the U.S. history leading to stricter 
immigration controls). 
 35. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 44–
69 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that there was no cohesive national immigration policy until the 
1920s, before which the country treated immigration as a necessary means towards acquiring 
a labor force); JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 52 (suggesting that immigration 
regulation was primarily a state matter prior to the late 1800s and reasonably balanced, but 
that the introduction of federal regulation around the turn of the century coincided with new 
attitudes towards immigrants). 
 36. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 49 ("[F]ears about job-stealing and the lowering of 
the standard of living by immigrants willing to work cheap were still shaping the national 
mood.  The nation was also gripped by xenophobia and a rejection of [Southern] Europe."). 
 37. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).  Noticeably absent were 
Asian immigrants, who had been barred for decades from gaining citizenship, and Central 
and South American immigrants, who were exempted from the quota system and therefore 
could migrate northward freely.  BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 67.  In addition, immigration 
from Africa was essentially ignored.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?:  Two 
Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L.R. 1927, 1933 (1996) (noting that 
"the descendents of slave immigrants" were virtually disqualified from participating in the 
quota system (internal quotations omitted)). 
 38. BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 68.  See also WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 13 (explaining 
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the 1960s, amended periodically to reflect unrelated political developments 
such as the refugee situations and the ideological conflicts following World 
War II.39  Prompted by a desire to bring together the scattered immigration 
laws as well as heightened fears of Communism, Congress then created the 
first unified system of federal immigration laws with the INA in 1952,40
strengthening the structure of the executive immigration agencies in the 
process.  This expansive law plainly preserved the national origins quota 
and further curtailed immigration from Communist countries.41  As 
revealed by subsequent legislative evaluations of the INA, deep-seated 
racial beliefs remained central to the legislation: 
Without giving credence to any theory of Nordic superiority, the [Senate 
Judiciary] subcommittee believes that the adoption of the national 
origins formula was a rational and logical method of numerically 
restricting immigration in such a manner as to best preserve the 
sociological and cultural balance in the population of the United 
States . . . [T]he subcommittee holds that the peoples who had made the 
greatest contribution to the development of this country were fully 
justified in . . . admit[ting] immigrants considered to be more readily 
assimilable . . . .42
Despite its racial language, the INA nevertheless set the stage for the 
upcoming changes in immigration law through some decidedly progressive 
changes:  the removal of explicit racial disqualifications, the recognition of 
skilled immigrants as a priority in immigration selections, and the creation 
                                                                                                                 
that the legislation controlled immigration rates by setting a maximum annual quota and 
allotting each European country an amount proportionate to its current representation in the 
U.S.); Boswell, supra note 33, at 324 (identifying the rising immigrant population fueling 
the Industrial Revolution and increased internal migration as potential causes for the 
tightened immigration legislation of the early 20th century). 
 39. See AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 11–16 (listing the more notable amendments to 
the Immigration Act of 1924, including the War Brides Act in 1945, which assisted soldiers 
in gaining citizenship for foreign national spouses married abroad, and the Internal Security 
Act in 1950, which intended to protect the U.S. from immigrating Communists and other 
criminals). 
 40. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.).  See also JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 54 ("A product of 
the Cold War, . . . the law is not particularly generous to immigrants.").  "The firm 
presumption under the INA is that noncitizens are not eligible to enter the United States 
unless they prove that they are admissible under the law."  Id.
 41. See Boswell, supra note 33, at 325 ("The national origin quota was made 
permanent in 1924 by enactment of the 1924 National Origins Act which lowered the annual 
quota of immigrants allowed into the United States . . . ."). 
 42. WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 89 (1953) [hereinafter WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME]). 
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of the underlying framework in immigration law generally that persists to 
this day.43
C.  The 1961 Amendments 
Identifiable immigration adjudications also emerged and developed 
during the early days of federal immigration policy.44  Prior to the middle of 
the twentieth century, these hearings merely served as an extension of 
executive enforcement and lacked any vestige of judicial impartiality.45
The long-established availability of the writ of habeas corpus, however, 
provided some measure of external review from the federal judiciary, and 
until 1952 was "the sole means by which an alien could test the legality of 
his or her deportation order . . . [and] challeng[e] Executive interpretations 
of the immigration laws."46  The creation of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) in 1941,47 an executive body which heard appeals from the 
immigration adjudications, represented the introduction of administrative 
review as a meaningful component of U.S. immigration policy.48
Subsequently, under the newly-enacted Administrative Procedures Act 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY,
1798–1965 312 (1981) (portraying the INA as a compromise between the various factions in 
that it eliminated blatant racism but kept the veiled racism of the national origins quota).  
The INA "embodied the majority opinion in Congress at the time.  It also became the focus 
of persistent efforts at revision and relaxation of the immigration laws over the following 
years . . . ."  Id. at 313. 
 44. See Dory Mitros Durham, Note, The Once and Future Judge:  The Rise and Fall 
(and Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 658 
(2006) ("The structure of adjudication in the immigration context has been in a state of near-
constant movement since Congress first attempted to draft comprehensive immigration 
legislation at the turn of the last century."). 
 45. See id. at 661–64 (explaining that prior to 1952, Congress allowed the federal 
immigration agencies to dictate adjudication procedures, leading to immigration officers 
serving as the "judge" with only a basic administrative appeals process available). 
 46. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305–06 (2001).  See Sarah A. Moore, Note, Tearing 
Down the Fence Around Immigration Law:  Examining the Lack of Judicial Review and the 
Impact of the REAL ID Act While Calling for a Broader Reading of Questions of Law to 
Encompass "Extreme Cruelty", 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2037, 2043 (2007) (observing that 
"the shortcoming of habeas review was that the noncitizen could not seek this form of relief 
until he or she was ‘in custody’"). 
 47. Creation of a Board of Immigration Appeals, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 
1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2009)). 
 48. See Durham, supra note 44, at 665 ("[T]he Board’s regulatory creation seems to 
reflect the belief that the preexisting adjudicatory structures provided too few procedural 
protections for aliens facing exclusion or deportation from the United States."). 
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(APA),49 the Supreme Court in 1950 analyzed immigration hearings and 
concluded that the executive immigration agencies were required to 
conduct formal adjudication procedures.50  The Court observed that a 
central purpose of the APA, to "curtail and change the practice of 
embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge," 
clearly applied to immigration proceedings.51  Five years later, following 
the overhaul of the immigration system under the INA, the Supreme Court 
declared that the APA also provided for review of agency action in federal 
district court.52  This decision, repudiating earlier efforts by Congress to 
exempt immigration proceedings from this provision of the APA,53 stated 
that "[t]he legislative history of both the Administrative Procedure Act and 
the 1952 Immigration Act supports [the noncitizen’s] rights to full judicial 
review of this deportation order."54  The Court also confirmed in 1953 a 
noncitizen’s constitutional right to petition the federal courts for habeas 
review, further solidifying the role of courts in immigration policy.55  Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.).  See also Durham, supra note 44, at 665 (explaining that the transformation of 
immigration hearings "echoed the revolutions in administrative agency adjudications 
generally that had been effected by the passage of the APA in 1946").   
 50. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 51 (1950) (holding that 
immigration adjudications were required by the INA and Due Process requirements, and 
therefore the APA’s formal adjudication procedures applied).  The APA did not universally 
impose adjudication procedure standards on the agencies but rather interpreted each 
agency’s organic statute to determine which standards were appropriate.  Id. at 36.  
Accordingly, the applicability of formal adjudication procedures came down to statutory 
interpretation and the parsing of Congressional language.  See Durham, supra note 44, at 
666 (explaining that "each agency was forced to struggle to define the specific requirements 
that the APA itself, read together with individual organic statutes, placed upon its day-to-day 
procedures"). 
 51. See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 41 (noting that this theme "was reiterated 
throughout the legislative history of the Act"). 
 52. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 52–53 (1955) (holding that the APA 
provides another avenue of judicial review for immigration adjudications conducted under 
the INA, in addition to the existing habeas review).  
 53. See Deportation and Exclusion:  A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and 
the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 771 (1962) [hereinafter Deportation and Exclusion]
(explaining that Congress’s answer to Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath was legislation 
"specifically exempting [the primary enforcement body under the INA] from the hearing 
requirements of the APA").  The Supreme Court initially agreed that the legislation did 
indeed create an exemption for the INA and was constitutionally sound.  See Marcello v. 
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) ("Unless we are to require the Congress to employ magical 
passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act, we 
must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the hearing provisions of that Act."). 
 54. Shaughnessy, 349 U.S. at 51–52. 
 55. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 240 (1953) ("[O]ne against whom a 
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by the mid-1950s, an immigrant facing deportation received a formal 
adjudication with the ability to seek review in an administrative body, in 
federal district court, and in the federal courts of appeal.56
In response to this rather sudden expansion of judicial procedures, 
Congress reclaimed control in 1961 by "prescribing for the first time a 
statutory scheme for judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders."57
The 1961 Amendments, located in section 106 of the INA,58 intended to 
prevent noncitizens from protracting the enforcement of final deportation 
decisions59 and settled on a conventional role for the judiciary in 
immigration adjudications.60  Resisting the "consistent congressional desire 
to limit judicial participation in immigration matters,"61 Congress 
recognized that "[a]liens seeking review of administrative orders should be 
                                                                                                                 
deportation order is outstanding but not executed, may at once move, by means of a 
declaratory judgment, to challenge the administrative process insofar as the substantive law 
pertaining to deportation permits challenge."). 
 56. See generally Durham, supra note 44 and accompanying text (showing the 
progression of immigrant rights in the court system).  See also Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 240 
(expanding immigrant rights in federal courts). 
 57. Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 760.  But see Gerald Seipp, Federal 
Court Jurisdiction to Review Immigration Decisions:  A Tug of War Between the Three 
Branches, 07-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2007) (noting that the references to deportation 
orders and exclusion orders are outdated, as Congress "combined deportation [removing the 
noncitizen from the country] and exclusion hearings [barring the noncitizen from entering 
the country], as of April 1, 1997, into a unified ‘removal’ hearing process"). 
 58. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (1961) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  See also Seipp, supra note 57
(placing the 1961 Amendment at the beginning of decades of Congressional efforts to 
clearly define judicial review of immigration proceedings). 
 59. See H.R. Rep 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2967 (1961) (portraying the underlying problem as 
"the growing frequency of judicial actions being instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases 
have no legal basis or merit, but which are brought solely for the purpose of preventing or 
delaying indefinitely their deportation from this country").  The Report contends that these 
manipulative noncitizens are "mostly subversives, gangsters, immoral, or narcotic peddlers, 
[who] manage to protract their stay here indefinitely only because their ill-gotten gains 
permit them to procure the services of astute attorneys who know how to skillfully exploit 
the judicial process."  Id.  See also Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 760 nn.3–4 
(describing the contentious legislative battle in the Senate over constricting judicial review 
as well as the persistent conviction by some Representatives that noncitizens abused judicial 
review). 
 60. See H.R. Rep 87-1086, pt. 1, at 2966 (1961) ("The purpose . . . is to create a single, 
separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and 
exclusion of aliens from the United States . . . ." (emphasis added)).  The Report also quoted 
testimony from a committee hearing:  "There are several objections to the divergent methods 
of review.  They lack uniformity . . . .  There is need for expedition, orderly venue, and the 
avoiding of repetitious court proceedings."  Id. at 2970. 
 61. Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 761. 
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given full and fair opportunity to do so . . . ."62  Thus, the 1961 Amendment 
established that the federal courts of appeals would review all orders of 
deportation if appealed within six months.63  However, exclusion orders 
would remain reviewable solely in the district courts through habeas 
petitions.64  This divergent treatment stemmed from the belief that 
noncitizens should not be granted anything but the most minimal access to 
the U.S. court system simply by appearing at the border and triggering an 
exclusion hearing.65
Yet, even with the narrower provision for exclusion hearings, the 1961 
Amendment stands as a congressional acknowledgement of the federal 
judiciary’s quintessential function as the check on executive enforcement 
practices.66  Confronted with the inevitability of judicial involvement 
through a habeas petition and the courts’ oversight of agency action through 
the APA, Congress simply decided to reassert its role as immigration 
policy-maker.67  The sensible achievements of the 1961 Amendment quietly 
endured for more than three decades,68 but the looming social revolutions 
                                                                                                                 
 62. H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2968 (1961).  The Report also contained a message 
from former President Dwight Eisenhower:  "Constitutional due process wisely confers upon 
any alien, whatever the charge, the right to challenge in the courts the Government’s finding 
of deportability."  Id.
 63. See H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2973 (1961) (concluding that "[i]t is obvious that 
6 months is sufficient and far beyond the realms of any claim of unfairness, for an alien to 
determine whether he really has a case upon which he should seek judicial review and to 
prepare therefore").  See also Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 762 n.18 
(suggesting that the law operates under the assumption that all petitions for review are 
abuses of the system and that the scarcity and complexity of the courts of appeals would 
discourage petitions for review since most immigrants did not have the necessary resources). 
 64. See Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 762 (commenting on the 
"ambivalent" nature of the 1961 Amendment, in that it solidifies review of deportation 
orders while also refusing direct judicial review of exclusion orders). 
 65. See H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2977 (1961) (stating that "no sound reason 
appears to the committee why excluded aliens arriving at the various ports in the United 
States should be permitted to burden an already overburdened court system").  But see
Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 786–88 (arguing that judicial review aims to 
prevent arbitrary enforcement decisions as well as protect individuals, and that the emphasis 
placed on the noncitizen’s location fails to take into account this dual responsibility). 
 66. See Deportation and Enforcement, supra note 53, at 761 (referring to the 1961 
Amendment as "the most recent episode in a long standing controversy between the courts 
and Congress in the area of immigration procedures and practices"). 
 67. See id. at 761–62 (describing the 1961 Amendment as both an expression of 
Congressional beliefs regarding immigration as well as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
insistence on judicial involvement in immigration matters). 
 68. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 46, at 2044–45 (commenting that congressional 
attitudes towards judicial review of immigration adjudications soured during the mid-1990s). 
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and the unprecedented legislation of the 1960s soon captivated the nation 
and profoundly altered the course of modern immigration. 
D.  The 1965 Amendments 
In the years following the 1952 enactment of the INA, with its 
perpetuation of the national origins system, politicians had already begun 
agitating for the "progressive liberalization of immigration policy."69  As 
soon as 1953, an immigration commission organized by President Harry 
Truman summarized public opinion towards the INA as follows:  
The consensus was to the effect that the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 injures our people at home, causes much resentment against 
us abroad, and impairs our position among the free nations, great and 
small, whose friendships and understanding is necessary if we are to 
meet and overcome the totalitarian menace.70
Although the impending Cold War clearly served as the primary 
inspiration to seek reform of the INA, the commission also cited 
considerations of equality and diversity, effectively rejecting the underlying 
rationale of the quota system.71  Viewing immigration policy as simply 
another means to undermine Communist countries,72 Congress all but 
ignored the commission’s report.73
As the post-war 1950s evolved into the turbulent 1960s, an 
increasingly mobilized constituency was demanding that Congress turn its 
attention to critical domestic issues.74  After decades of hard work, the 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 43, at 314 (outlining the period of relative stability 
immediately following the creation of the INA and the increasing efforts to modify it with 
each passing year). 
 70. WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME, supra note 42, at 19. 
 71. See id. at xii–xv (listing "truths" about the United States related to immigration 
policy, including the belief that "American national unity has been achieved without national 
uniformity"). 
 72. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 125–26 (describing refugee legislation during the 
1950s as intended primarily for immigrants from Communist or formerly Fascist nations). 
 73. See id. at 122–23 (observing that Congress declined to hold hearings on the 
report).  "The commission’s work was not entirely futile, however, and Whom Shall We 
Welcome did become a liberal icon.  The Truman commission’s report provided a national 
agenda largely realized in 1965, with a final element accepted in 1980 . . . ."  Id. at 123. 
 74. See David Farber & Beth Bailey, Introduction, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO AMERICA 
IN THE 1960S 1, 1–12 (David Farber & Beth Bailey eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) 
(describing the political obsession with international military concerns following World War 
II until "an unexpected revolution" broke out at home). 
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African-American civil rights movement had reached a critical stage.75  The 
escalating war in Vietnam was steadily eroding the relationship between 
segments of the nation and the federal government.76  Additionally, 
countercultural and egalitarian sentiments were on the rise,77 feminism was 
experiencing a resurgence,78 and progressive developments were altering 
the legal landscape, including the criminal justice system.79  These 
expanding campaigns for equality, culminating in "[t]he equal-rights 
revolution that ended legally sanctioned racism and sexism,"80 also inspired 
Congress to consolidate behind the enduring drive to end the national 
origins quota system and enact the unparalleled Immigration Act of 1965.81
The legislative history of the 1965 Amendments reflects this 
momentum, and champions "a new system of selection designed to be fair, 
rational, humane, and in the national interest."82  In practice the national 
origins system had not fared well,83 though Congress itself was partially 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See id. at 13–19 (reviewing the sequence of events during the first few years of the 
1960s that drove the civil rights movement into the national spotlight).  "The civil rights 
movement did not start in the 1960s. . . .  In the 1960s, however, for the first time, black 
Americans in large numbers . . . demanded their rights as citizens under the United States 
Constitution."  Id. at 13. 
 76. See WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 387 ("Vietnam . . . destroyed credibility within the 
American political process [because] [t]he public came to distrust its leaders, and many 
officials distrusted the public."). 
 77. See Farber & Bailey, supra note 74, at 55–63 (juxtaposing the various sectors of 
1960s culture, including consumerist, youth, black, and nonconformist subcultures, and 
asserting that "[a]ll expressed a growing acceptance of cultural pluralism").  This approval of 
"greater cultural diversity and social experimentation" was also indicative of the majority 
support for "the idea that personal expression and individual freedom were a critical aspect 
of the American way of life."  Id. at 62–63. 
 78. See WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 439–40 (outlining the causes for the revival of the 
feminism movement, including the variety of intellectual, economic, medical, and political 
factors).  
 79. See Rusty L. Monhollon, Law and Justice, in THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE 1960S
281, 281–87 (David Farber & Beth Bailey eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) (commenting 
on the liberal advances made by the federal government, especially the Supreme Court, in 
areas such as civil liberties, education, and privacy). 
 80. Farber & Bailey, supra note 74, at 76. 
 81. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106 (contending that "there was a direct link 
between [immigration reform in 1965] and the success of civil rights legislation"); Boswell, 
supra note 33, at 326–28 (arguing that the 1965 Amendments to the INA formed part of a 
larger political collaboration to improve the civil rights reputation of the U.S. abroad). 
 82. S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 13 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3332.  See 
generally JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964) (presenting the important 
role that immigration has played in the development of the United States and reasoning for 
the eradication of the national origins system). 
 83. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 11 (1965) ("The national origins system has failed to 
478 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 463 (2011)
responsible due to years of special allowances for refugees.84  Nevertheless, 
despite some opposition,85 both houses showed wide support for the bill.86
In essence, the legislation replaced the former race-based admissions 
scheme with a preference system weighted towards family reunification and 
skilled workers.87  Congress left the majority of the INA intact, 
intentionally limiting its efforts to the national origins system.88  In a 
concession to restrictionist members of Congress, however, the bill also 
included immigration restrictions from the Western Hemisphere for the first 
time.89  These focused efforts, however, removed manifest racism from the 
INA and deeply altered both immigration patterns and immigration 
                                                                                                                 
maintain the ethnic balance of the American population as it was designed and intended 
since the nations favored with the high quotas have left their quotas largely unused."). 
 84. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 115 (commenting that by 1965 the national origins 
system "was more like a colander than a shield").  See also S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 3–4 
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3331–32 (expressing the congressional 
sentiment that the refugee adjustments were a necessary measure); H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 
12 (1965) (same).  Congress noticeably attempted to distance itself from the 1924 
legislation, stressing its humanitarian efforts despite the strictures of the quota system.  See
S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 4 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3331 ("The 
performance of the Congress in the field of immigration in the postwar period has been far 
more generous and sympathetic than adherence to the national origins system alone would 
allow . . . ."). 
 85. See S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 19 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3346-
49 ("[N]o one should be so naïve as to believe that the adoption of this bill will end the cries 
to change our immigration laws.").  The Representative then forecasts that the 1965 
Amendments "would only be the opening wedge in a continuing effort to chip and chip and 
chip until our immigration laws would be a shambles."  Id. at 3346. 
 86. See GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 10, at 108–09 (giving the final vote tallies as 
320-69 in the House and 76-18 in the Senate).  See also LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, 
at 11–12 (observing that in the years prior to the 1965 Amendments, large numbers of 
Congressmen were submitting their own bills to reform immigration laws). 
 87. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 12 (1965) (summarizing the admissions system as 
"based upon first come, first served, without regard to place of birth, within the preference 
categories, and subject to specified limitations"); S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 1–2 (1965), 
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3329–30 (noting that the new system gave priority "to 
close relatives of U.S. citizens . . . , to aliens who are members of the professions, arts, or 
sciences, and to skilled or unskilled laborers who are needed in the United States, and to 
certain refugees"). 
 88. See S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 1–2 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3329 
(expressing the limited purpose of the 1965 Amendments as removing the national origins 
system); H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 13 (1965) (same).  But see HUTCHINSON, supra note 43, at 
378 (noting that the 1965 Act went further than the 1952 Act "by adding several new 
components to the structure of immigration law and policy"). 
 89. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 110 (explaining that a ceiling on immigration from 
Latin America was a compromise necessary to gain the support needed to pass the 
legislation). 
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policy.90  In the words of President Lyndon Johnson at the signing of the 
bill: 
[The 1965 Amendments] repair a very deep and painful flaw in the 
fabric of American justice.  It corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the 
conduct of the American nation . . . .  The fairness of [the new] standard 
is so self-evident that we may well wonder that it has not always been 
applied.91
The substance of the 1965 Amendments paralleled contemporaneous 
developments in other areas of U.S. politics and law.92  The combined 
effect of these other changes suggests a compelling rationale for the 1965 
Amendments far beyond the desire to improve the American reputation 
abroad for Cold War purposes.93  The seminal achievement of the 1960s, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,94 exemplified the evolving attitudes about 
race and the legal structure.95  Advances in education, gender equality, and 
civil liberties in general demonstrated both Congress and the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to heed the appeals for progressive change.96  Finally, 
the protection of constitutional rights in criminal matters evinced a renewed 
commitment to personal liberties.97  In conjunction with these 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 51 (referring to 1965 as a 
"watershed in U.S. immigration policy" before adding that immigration laws continue to 
have subtler but equally discriminatory effects). 
 91. President’s Message to Congress, Oct. 3, 1965. 
 92. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 281–87 (recounting the major legal occurrences 
in the U.S. of the decade for a host of separate groups, including minorities and women); 
BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106 ("Between 1964 and 1966 the most ambitious domestic 
reform agenda in the nation’s history was proposed and enacted."). 
 93. See JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 51 ("The civil rights movement of 
the 1950s and 1960s . . . dramatically changed the law in ways completely at odds with the 
racial exclusions in place in the U.S. immigration laws."); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106–07 
(suggesting that the proscription against racial categorization of citizens created a "political 
climate" favorable to progressive immigration legislation). 
 94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 95. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 
2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 
110–12 (2007) (crediting the coalescence of racially disparate groups as a central 
explanation for the success of the African-American civil rights movement).  The authors 
suggest that a combination of coordinated and sustained efforts at the local level propelled a 
hesitant federal government into passing the Civil Rights Act.  Id.
 96. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 281–82 (describing how "altered conceptions of 
justice and methods for promoting them" spurred the federal government into action).  The 
author establishes three principles that served as guideposts for many of the 
accomplishments during this time:  a commitment to equal protection, a standardized system 
of justice nation-wide, and an accessible and active court system.  Id. 
 97. See infra Part V.B.i–ii (describing the "criminal procedure revolution" and its 
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developments, the 1965 Amendments explicitly eliminated race from the 
immigration admissions system, enjoyed wide support in Congress, and 
derived at least in part from the historic ideals of fairness and equality.98
All of these related achievements "reflected a vision of distributive justice 
in which the government assumed responsibility for actively protecting 
citizens’ individual rights and economic opportunities . . . ."99
E.  Subsequent Reform—Increasing Enforcement, Decreasing Judicial 
Review 
In spite of their shared values, the lasting impact of these political 
and legal transformations was not uniform—some prospered while 
others faltered.100  Within immigration law, the 1965 Amendments 
initially provided a measure of stability, which lasted well over a 
decade.101  However, in the years following the 1965 Amendments, the 
country witnessed a large and unexpected influx of immigrants,102 a 
                                                                                                                 
legacy). 
 98. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law:  A 
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 300–02 
(1996) (citing the legislative history of the 1965 Amendments to confirm the congressional 
concern with the lack of racial equality in immigration law).  But see Boswell, supra note 
33, at 332–46 (examining the "barriers" against immigration into the U.S. which the 1965 
Amendments did not remove, including barriers in the legal structure, the traditional norms 
of immigration law, and continued biases from both politicians and the public).  While the 
1965 Amendments did not fashion a perfect system of immigration, the author admits that 
"[i]n retrospect, it appears that the 1965 Amendments have been the last positive 
immigration reform of the twentieth century."  Id. at 332. 
 99. Monhollon, supra note 79, at 281.  But see BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 7–8 
(maintaining that the 1965 Amendments, despite "purging the immigration statutes of the 
explicit racism inherent in the national origin system," nevertheless perpetuated restricted 
amounts of immigration). 
 100. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 286–87 (noting that "racial and gender 
equality . . . have now become widely accepted" while "abortion and the outlawing of 
school-sponsored prayer continue to cause major political conflict"). 
 101. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 220 (explaining the variety of events that "pushed 
immigration policy to the fore," including economic fears and renewed anti-immigrant 
sentiments).  But see Boswell, supra note 33, at 329 (observing that a reaction against the 
1965 Amendments occurred as soon as the early 1970s); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 158 
(lamenting the lack of congressional action in immigration in the years after the 1965 
Amendments despite rising issues such as undocumented immigration). 
 102. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 13–17 (describing the declining 
immigration from Europe and the concurrent rise in immigration from Asian and Latin 
American countries). 
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development that Congress had actually attempted to avoid.103  This new 
wave of immigration, paired with national economic troubles, pushed 
Congress once again towards immigration reform.104  "In the process [of 
debating immigration policy], old ghosts of racial and ethnic tensions 
would be resurrected once again, albeit dressed in more muted and 
restrained political language."105  A critical cause of the renewed tension 
was a massive increase in undocumented immigration, which had 
ironically been spurred by the cap on immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere and the consequent "backlogs in legal visa-processing 
time . . . thereby increasing pressure to enter without inspection."106
Though relatively new to immigration policy debates, undocumented 
immigration came to be the true impetus behind the next significant 
immigration legislation, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA),107 as well as the dominant theme in every immigration 
policy debate in the ensuing decades.108
IRCA focused primarily on enforcement in the context of labor and 
employment,109 and most subsequent immigration legislation of 
importance would concentrate on domestic enforcement in some 
fashion.110  This legislation contained four central directives:  sanctions 
against U.S. employers of undocumented immigrants, stricter 
enforcement controls, and the formation of both amnesty and guest 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 109–14 (outlining the debates and compromises that 
ultimately produced the 1965 Amendments and which centered largely on the details of the 
new preference system and its attempts to control immigration). 
 104. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 25–27 (describing the "growing sense of 
crisis" during the 1970s in response to increased undocumented immigration). 
 105. HAYES, supra note 7, at 18. 
 106. KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 225.   
 107. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C). 
 108. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 21–25 (showing that undocumented 
immigrants formed a large part in the massive upsurge of immigration and thus came to 
dominate the perception of immigration); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 154–58 (explaining the 
"explosion of illegal immigration" partially through the termination of the bracero guest 
worker program in 1964, which had established a pattern of migration by Mexican laborers 
in seasonal employment in the U.S. agricultural industry).   
 109. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 163 ("The passage of IRCA produced the most 
extensive legislation in the area of employment law in the United States in two 
decades . . . ."). 
 110. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 219 (commenting that by the mid-1980s, proposals 
for immigration reform came from a range of ideological stance, but that generally 
immigration reform "meant undoing, somehow, much of the unintended consequences of the 
1965 act"). 
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worker programs.111  Immigration adjudications lay beyond the scope of 
the law and thus continued to operate in much the same fashion as they 
had since the 1961 Amendment.112  This included the federal judiciary’s 
appellate role, maintaining an important external check on the process of 
deportation for immigration proceedings and continuing the "public 
perception of . . . appropriate procedural fairness."113
The increased emphasis on enforcement in IRCA signaled a 
significant transition in immigration policy that would more clearly 
materialize in the 1990s.114  Immigration had grown more contentious as 
the public debate increasingly focused on negative effects of immigrants 
within the country.115  Congress reacted by passing two pieces of 
legislation in 1996, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (AEDPA)116 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).117  Designed to tighten the influx 
and regulate the presence of immigrants in the country, the laws 
"expanded the litany of crimes for which aliens can be summarily 
deported, eliminated waiver of deportation relief, and precluded judicial 
review of certain deportation orders."118  The legislation also completely 
removed the 1961 Amendments, permitting only narrow allowances for 
federal judicial review and completely prohibiting review for certain 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Introduction to U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORM 
IN THE 1980S:  A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 2–10 (Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz et al. eds., 
1991) (expressing doubt as to the success of all four components of the IRCA, but noting 
that measuring the progress of the law is inherently difficult due to the nature of 
undocumented immigration). 
 112. See Durham, supra note 44, at 675 ("Immigration judges were adjudicating the 
same types of controversies that their predecessors had adjudicated since the turn of the 
century, although with greater independence from the much larger and more powerful INS.") 
 113. Id. at 676. 
 114. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 232–47 (explaining the rise in public sentiments 
against immigration and Congress’s reaction to this shift through "get tough" legislation). 
 115. Id. at 239–40 (detailing the increased media scrutiny received by immigrants 
generally, and especially undocumented immigrants, as well the government agencies 
responsible for immigration matters). 
 116. Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 117. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 118. Sara A. Martin, Postcards From the Border:  A Result-Oriented Analysis of 
Immigration Reform Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 683, 683–84 
(1999).  The author notes that the terms "Orwellian," "Kafkaesque," and "draconian" were 
used by critics to characterize the two pieces of legislation.  Id. at 683–84. 
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criminal deportees.119  Federal courts, which had for decades served as 
courts of appeal for immigration proceedings, began to see themselves 
removed from the picture.120  The legislation prompted confusion, 
however, especially as to the extent to which habeas corpus review still 
remained.121  The circuit split that developed was resolved by the 
Supreme Court in 2001 in INS v. St. Cyr,122 ruling that federal habeas 
review remained available as Congress had not clearly eliminated it 
through IIRIRA. 
Congress’s response to St. Cyr came four years later with the REAL 
ID Act of 2005 (RIDA), the last and currently controlling law of a series 
of laws aimed at removing the federal courts from immigration.123
Included in the law was an explicit denial of traditional habeas 
review,124 which had been an important mechanism in immigration law 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See id. at 701–06 (describing the restrictions on review by the federal courts as 
"the most controversial portions of the new legislation").  See also Andrea Lovell, The 
Proper Scope of Habeas Corpus Review in Civil Removal Proceedings, 73 WASH. L. REV.
459, 463–65 (1998) (noting that the legislation was prompted partially by fears of increasing 
criminal activity and thus treated criminal immigrants particularly harshly). 
 120. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 229 ("If judicial review of deportation 
orders is an essential part of the rule of law, then 1996 could well have been the year in 
which the rule of deportation law died."). 
 121. See Lovell, supra note 119, at 459–61 (reviewing the difficulty that courts had in 
deciding how to apply the language of IIRIRA to habeas petitions in light of the unique 
circumstances of their habeas corpus responsibilities). 
 122. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (finding that federal courts retained 
the ability to hear habeas corpus petitions).  The Court considered whether federal courts 
retained jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute.  Id. at 298.  In St. Cyr, INS 
enacted removal proceedings against Enrico St. Cyr in April 1997, more than a year after his 
criminal conviction.  Id. at 293.  In the intermediate period between St. Cyr’s conviction and 
the commencement of removal proceedings, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA were enacted by 
Congress, eliminating the possibility for waiver of deportation at the discretion of the 
Attorney General.  Id. at 292–93.  The Court reiterated the viewpoint that statutes must be 
interpreted, if possible, to avoid constitutional problems; a presumption that ran against the 
viewpoint argued by INS.  Id. at 300.  The Court found support from the historical basis of 
habeas corpus and its important role in deportation orders.  Id. at 301–03.  Additionally, the 
Court found that even where judicial review was precluded, the Court was still permitted 
limited review of habeas corpus.  Id. at 311–12.  The Court expressed some dismay at 
Congress’s rather dismissive treatment of habeas corpus:  "[T]o conclude that the writ is no 
longer available in this context would represent a departure from historical practice in 
immigration law.  The writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality 
of Executive detention."  Id. at 305. 
 123. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 49 U.S.C.). 
 124. See Jennifer Norako, Accuracy or Fairness?:  The Meaning of Habeas Corpus 
Review After Boumediene v. Bush And Its Implications On Alien Removal Orders, 58 AM.
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"since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789."125  Under Supreme 
Court precedent, however, the venerated habeas corpus petition cannot 
be denied without offering a sufficient replacement.126  With this in 
mind, Congress crafted a seemingly suitable alternate:  judicial review 
can now only occur after all administrative proceedings were exhausted 
and only regarding "constitutional claims and questions of law."127
Habeas review traditionally has been thought of as a challenge to the 
legality of executive detention, not any factual determinations behind 
it,128 and therefore RIDA’s new language initially appears to track this 
standard.  As will be discussed below, recent developments in habeas 
corpus jurisprudence have put the validity of RIDA in doubt. 
II.  Current Process of Removal Proceeding 
Prior to evaluating any policy choices as manifested in 
immigration removal hearings, it is helpful to briefly examine the 
typical components and processes of such hearings.  As with most 
governmental operations, Congress designs the procedures and 
allocates the authority necessary to carry out its policy determinations.  
Executive agencies then carry out these mandates and craft appropriate 
regulations as needed, and the Judiciary reviews appeals of final 
decisions to ensure legitimate law and proper procedure.  This familiar 
structure, however, has been altered in the immigration context by 
Congress and the executive branch through a controversial emphasis 
on the first two stages.129  Though the federal Judiciary theoretically 
                                                                                                                 
U. L. REV. 1611, 1622 (2009) (noting that Congress’s intent to replace habeas corpus review 
was unambiguous, purportedly to answer the Supreme Court’s ruling in St. Cyr). 
 125. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305. 
 126. Id. at 305 (observing that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution requires that 
unless Congress formally revokes the writ of habeas corpus, it must provide a suitable 
alternative should it remove the availability of the writ). 
 127. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 310 
(2005). 
 128. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306–07 (remarking that in the immigration context, a 
habeas corpus petition was historically "the sole means by which an alien could test the 
legality of his or her deportation order" (emphasis added)). 
 129. See generally Benson, Paper Dolls, supra note 30 (blaming the barriers placed 
between federal courts for the severe issues plaguing immigration adjudications and the 
many parties involved).  See also Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration 
Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 599–600 (2009) (viewing all three levels 
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maintains its traditional role, immigration law now largely concludes 
at the enforcement stage.130  This atypical arrangement not only reveals 
past policy considerations but consequently affects the future behavior 
of the other actors. 
It also should be noted that immigration is an entirely federal 
domain.  As early as 1849, the Supreme Court insinuated that 
immigration policy belonged to the federal government,131 and 
unequivocally stated so by the 1880s.132  Though the constitutional and 
theoretical rationales for this "plenary power" are not absolutely 
accepted,133 this long-standing doctrine remains foundational to 
immigration policy.134  Despite revived efforts by state and local 
governments to regulate immigration135 and federal agencies’ recent 
collaborations with municipal authorities,136 immigration remains a 
federal prerogative.  Consequently, immigration reform as a matter of 
course will take place at the federal level and on the national stage. 
                                                                                                                 
of immigration adjudication, those being the two administrative courts and then the federal 
judiciary, in dire need of reform). 
 130. See Family, supra note 129, at 600–04 (describing the many problems faced by all 
judges involved in immigration adjudications that hamper their ability to produce impartial 
and adequate rulings).  The author views high caseloads, politicized hiring and firing 
processes, and inadequate representation as the main problems.  Id.
 131. See LEGOMSKY, JUDICIARY, supra note 25, at 178–82 (describing a Supreme Court 
ruling that a state tax on the "importation of alien passengers . . . usurped an exclusively 
federal power"). 
 132. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604–06 (1889) (holding that the power 
to exclude aliens is an inherent authority of the sovereign federal government that does not 
depend on an enumerated power). 
 133. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 574 (2008) (referring to the federal government’s 
undivided power over immigration policy as "the exclusivity lie"). 
 134. See AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 2 (explaining Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration shared with the Executive branch); and LEGOMSKY, supra note 25, at 178–80 
(same). 
 135. See Rodríguez, supra note 133, at 581–90 (presenting an illustration of states’ 
rather comprehensive approaches to immigrants within their borders). 
 136. See generally Maria Fernanda Parra-Chico, An Up-Close Perspective:  The 
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws by State and Local Police, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 321, 323–31 (2008) (detailing the history and current enthusiasm for utilizing local 
authorities to assist the federal agencies in enforcing immigration policy). 
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A.  Executive Enforcement Producing Removal Hearings 
All removal hearings begin with some form of contact between 
the noncitizen and one of three federal agencies tasked with initiating 
such proceedings.137  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) patrols the 
physical borders as well as ports-of-entry, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) investigates and pursues immigration violations 
within the nation, and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 
oversees lawful immigration into the country and monitors those 
immigrants lawfully present.138  Whether it is CIS mailing a summons 
to a permanent resident charged with a fraudulent marriage139 or ICE 
arresting hundreds of employees during a workplace raid and hand-
delivering the summons while they sit in detention,140 these noncitizens 
are now respondents in an immigration court proceeding. 
Although immigration adjudications remain technically civil 
hearings, immigration enforcement measures have become highly 
criminalized in a number of manners.141  First and most importantly, 
the use of criminal convictions as cause for removal has spiked since 
Congress began emphasizing criminality as a cause for deportation.142
                                                                                                                 
 137. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2005).  See also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.) (explaining 
the structure of federal agencies within the Department of Homeland Security since 2002, 
and the immigration courts which remain within the Department of Justice and, thus, 
separate from other immigration agencies). 
 138. See Stephen Yale-Loehr et al., Overview of Immigration Law, 1727 PLI/Corp 73, 
83 (2009) (presenting a brief outline of the federal agencies involved in immigration and 
their responsibilities). 
 139. See Dinesh Shenoy & Salima Oines Khakoo, One Strike and You’re Out!  The 
Crumbling Distinction Between the Criminal and the Civil for Immigrants in the Twenty-
First Century, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 135, 138–43 (2008) (clarifying that all aliens, 
defined as any person who is not a full-fledged citizen of the United States, are at risk of 
deportation, including permanent residents). 
 140. Cf. Erik Camayd-Freixas, Raids, Rights and Reform:  The Postville Case and the 
Immigration Crisis, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 1–5 (2008) (presenting an overview of 
the notorious raid in Postville, Iowa by ICE in 2008 that arrested and detained hundreds of 
undocumented workers). 
 141. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration 
Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 
472–73 (2007) (remarking that courts have long insisted that deportation is not a criminal 
punishment, and consequently that immigration hearings are purely civil in nature, yet many 
criminal elements are currently present in the immigration system).  The author describes an 
"emerging trend in U.S. immigration law [of the] heightened use of criminal enforcement 
strategies, both in setting immigration priorities and in executing them."  Id. at 475. 
 142. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1720–28 
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Any noncitizen, including permanent residents, is susceptible to the 
"collateral effects" of deportation.143  Second, the raid and detention 
practices of ICE push the boundaries of acceptable government action 
and seemingly violate the most basic norms of criminal procedure 
law.144  Despite the impact on immigrant families and the questionable 
reliability of the routines, they continue to be widely employed.145
Third, federal agencies increasingly make use of state and local 
authorities to carry out their goals.146  Equipped with greater access to 
a national immigration database and a working relationship with ICE, 
some local police forces have been authorized to enforce federal 
immigration laws.147
                                                                                                                 
(2009) (describing the "major expansion of immigration sanctions, higher levels of 
enforcement, and a narrowing of avenues for the government to exercise discretionary relief 
from removal" that took place in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 143. See Shenoy & Khakoo, supra note 139, at 151–57 (remarking on the low standards 
required for a noncitizen to be deemed a criminal for purposes of potentially triggering 
removal hearings).  Essentially any type of acceptance of criminal wrongdoing by the 
noncitizen will suffice, including the mere admittance of facts that could suffice for a 
conviction.  Id. See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1492–94 (2010) (holding that 
undocumented defendants have a right under the Sixth Amendment to be told by their 
attorney of the risk of deportation attached to various criminal convictions). 
 144. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and "Aliens":  Privacy Expectations and the 
Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1129 (seeking to limit the current 
autonomy that immigration raids possess as administrative searches by requiring Fourth 
Amendment rules to be followed); see also David B. Thronson, Creating 
Crisis:  Immigration Raids and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 391, 417–18 (arguing for greater scrutiny of immigration raids in order to protect the 
sanctity of homes and families).  ICE’s other current programs include the "Border 
Enforcement Security Task Force" which "[i]nvestigate[s] and dismantle[s] transnational 
criminal enterprises at U.S. borders and key seaports" as well as the "Secure Communities" 
program which "[f]ocuses federal resources on assisting local communities by identifying 
and removing high-risk criminal aliens."  U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
TOPICS OF INTEREST:  PROGRAMS (2010), http://www.ice.gov/pi/topics/index.htm (providing 
a list of ICE’s "key programs and initiatives") (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 145. See Katherine Evans, The Ice Storm in U.S. Homes:  An Urgent Call for Policy 
Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561, 565 (commenting that ICE has 
"dramatically expanded its interior immigration enforcement efforts" including thousands of 
home raids). 
 146. See Parra-Chico, supra note 136, at 324–30 (describing the "blurring of lines of 
authority between federal and local law enforcement of both criminal and civil immigration 
laws"). 
 147. See id. at 327–30 (observing that state and local law enforcement now have access 
to federal immigration agency information through national databases). 
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B.  Removal Hearings 
The respondent will then proceed to a removal hearing at one of the 
federal immigration courts throughout the country.148  These administrative 
courts conduct civil hearings within the Department of Justice and are the 
main judicial component of the immigration structure.149  The precise 
procedure of the hearing itself and the burden of proof will depend on the 
charge brought against the respondent.150  Despite their resemblance to 
ordinary criminal trials and the dire consequences of a finding of 
removability,151 these hearings operate rather informally.152  The 
immigration judge plays an active role in the proceedings along with the 
government prosecutor:  "[T]he immigration judge can and will jump in at 
any time and ask questions of his or her own; some judges are known to 
take away examination entirely from counsel."153  Moreover, the rights 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See generally OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, FY 2009
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2010) B1–R3, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf 
(offering a synopsis of the Immigration Courts during 2009, including statistics on the types 
of cases heard and the rate of processing).  Prior to the actual hearing, the respondent may 
accept the charges and agree to voluntarily depart from the country.  Immigration and 
Nationality Act, § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2006). 
 149. See Family, supra note 129, at 598–604 (providing an outline of the general 
procedures and problems contained within Immigration Courts, which generally are the 
authorities who decide "whether the government will remove a foreign national from the 
United States"). 
 150. See Mary E. Kramer, Practicing Before the Immigration Court:  Crimes and Other 
Grounds of Removal and Application for Relief, SL010 ALI-ABA 239, 243 (2006) 
(commenting that generally the burden of proof of admissibility will be on the noncitizen 
who has entered or attempted to enter the country "without inspection," but that the 
government will carry the burden of proof of inadmissibility for noncitizens who were 
inspected upon entry).  A deportable alien trying to avoid removal may seek several forms of 
relief, such as voluntary departure, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, asylum, 
withholding of removal, and waiver.  Id. at 267–80 (listing the many possibilities for relief 
from deportation). 
 151. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (remarking that deportation 
"may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living").  See 
also Stumpf, supra note 142, at 1690–93 (critiquing the lack of availability of other penalties 
in the context of immigration, and decrying the lack of proportionality of deportation to the 
"crimes" of immigration). 
 152. See Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in 
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 113, 117–20 ("The merits 
hearing ‘generally conforms to the familiar adversarial model,’ albeit without many of the 
procedural protections present in criminal trials."). 
 153. Kramer, supra note 150, at 245.  See also Veena Reddy, Judicial Review of Final 
Orders of Removal in the Wake of the REAL ID Act, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 566 (2008) 
(commenting on the affirmative duty of Immigration Judges to develop a factual record on 
which to base their final decision). 
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afforded to the respondent in this civil hearing resemble only a skeletal 
version of the due process procedures that characterize the average criminal 
trial.154  The respondent’s ability to post bond depends entirely on the 
charge entered by the federal agency.155  Currently there is no comparable 
right to counsel, although respondents may furnish counsel at their own 
expense. 156  The Federal Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply157 and 
there is only a restricted right of confrontation.  Finally, the opportunity for 
review of an immigration judge’s final decision is constrained both by 
statute and the practical realities of an overburdened court system.158
Following the immigration judge’s decision, both the respondents as 
well as the government may appeal administratively to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.159  The BIA, also within the Department of Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm:  The Impact of the 
Board of Immigration Appeal’s Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
481, 485–86 (attempting to explain the unclear due process rights of noncitizen respondents 
in deportation hearings).  "[T]he Supreme Court has been deferential to the legislative and 
executive branches in deciding immigration policy questions . . . .  The Court has never 
provided a definitive answer to the question of which constitutional rights outweigh plenary 
power.  Rather, it has addressed different scenarios under which it has given some, little, or 
no protection to immigrants under the Constitution."  Id.
 155. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).  See also 8
C.F.R. §§ 103.1(j), 287.5(c) (2007); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) (2007) (providing that for 
respondents who are not statutorily barred from release on bond, the decision is made by 
ICE prosecutors and only involves immigration judges if the respondent seeks review). 
 156. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) ("In any 
removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . the person concerned shall have the 
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, 
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.").  See also Kaufman, supra
note 152, at 124–30 (claiming that beyond the lack of appointed counsel, procedural barriers 
often prevent respondents’ counsel from providing full representation). 
 157. See Kramer, supra note 150, at 244 ("Anything which is relevant is admissible in 
immigration court. However, most courts do have Local Rules, which govern the filing of 
motions, exhibits, and applications."). 
 158. See generally Shruti Rana, "Streamlining" the Rule of Law:  How the Department 
of Justice is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 859–
64 (2009) (describing the efforts of executive branch officials to minimize the role of 
immigration adjudications by supposedly increasing efficiency through abbreviated 
processes).  See also Benson, Paper Dolls, supra note 30, at 41–43 (remarking on 
Congress’s recent efforts "to reduce the quantity and quality of judicial review of 
administrative removal orders" but whose "net effect was a multiplication of levels and 
forms of judicial review"). 
 159. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2008).  The board’s appellate jurisdiction covers essentially the 
entire scope of the decisions made by immigration judges, including orders of exclusion and 
deportation.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2008).  Notably, either party to the original proceeding, 
either the respondent or the government, may seek BIA appeal of an immigration judge’s 
decision.  8 C.F.R. 1003.3(a) (2002). 
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and under the close supervision of the Attorney General,160 receives the full 
record of the case upon which to conduct its review.161  The BIA cannot 
undertake de novo review of the facts as established by the immigration 
judge, and applies instead the highly deferential "clearly erroneous" 
standard.162  Moreover, the BIA is clearly barred from establishing any 
factual findings not stated by the immigration judge, and must instead 
remand the decision to the immigration judge where further factual 
conclusions are needed.163  Questions of law and other discretionary 
matters, however, may be reviewed de novo.164  "The Board’s decisions are 
binding on [the] immigration judges, and precedential decisions are binding 
on the [Department of Justice] and immigration judges in all proceedings 
involving the same issue."165
The BIA, now reaching its seventieth year of operation, has recently 
been subject to regulatory "streamlining" efforts which alter the basic 
appeals process and actually interfere with the judicial integrity necessary 
to impart an honest review.166  For much of its history, the BIA heard 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See Reddy, supra note 153, at 565–66 n.57 ("Like Immigration Courts, the BIA is 
part of the Department of Justice, subject to the general supervision of the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR) of the [Department of Justice], and its attorneys are 
appointed by the Attorney General.").  Nevertheless, the BIA has slowly gained 
independence from the enforcement arm of immigration since its inception in the 1940s, and 
though it is not completely independent today, the trend has been to sever it from the 
Attorney General and the enforcement arm of immigration policy.  See Durham, supra note 
44, at 682 (observing that a common thread between all of the changes to the BIA during its 
history are "measures which seek to create deeper separation between the judge and 
prosecutor"). 
 161. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3 (2002).  See Rana, supra note 158, at 843 (listing the various 
documents that the BIA will include in its review, including "transcripts of testimony, 
exhibits, briefs submitted by the parties, and the written decision of the immigration judge"). 
 162. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). 
 163. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).  "Except for taking administrative notice of 
commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of official documents, the 
Board will not engage in fact finding in the course of deciding appeals.  A party asserting 
that the Board cannot properly resolve an appeal without further fact finding must file a 
motion for remand.  If further fact finding is needed in a particular case, the Board may 
remand the proceeding to the immigration judge or, as appropriate, to the Service."  Id.
 164. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii). 
 165. Rana, supra note 158, at 843 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)). 
 166. See generally id. (presenting a comprehensive evaluation of the streamlining 
efforts and their detrimental effect on judicial review of immigration enforcement actions).  
The BIA’s procedures and the Board itself are wholly dependent on agency-issued 
regulations, and thus the Attorney General has unfettered authority to alter every aspect of 
the BIA.  Id. at 843 (noting that the BIA, which is the "nation’s chief administrative body for 
immigration law," nevertheless exists "only by virtue of the regulations established by the 
Attorney General"). 
GUIDANCE FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM 491 
appeals in three-member panels and issued written decisions.167  In 1999, 
however, special allowances were made for occasional decisions by a single 
member of the Board in order to process a growing number of appeals.168
The subsequent Attorney General intensified the trend towards less judicial 
review despite improvements in the Board’s efficiency, and essentially 
made the special streamlined processes the norm.169  A single member of 
the BIA can now affirm an immigration judge’s decision without any 
written opinion, while overturning an immigration court decision still 
requires a written decision.170  At the same time, tighter deadlines were 
required for the BIA, thereby increasing the average Board member’s 
caseload to 4,000 appeals a year.171  Finally, the number of members on the 
BIA has been reduced from twenty-three members to currently fourteen 
members.172  The effects of this streamlining effort have been to actually 
increase appeals and provoke harsh criticism from federal judges.173
                                                                                                                 
 167. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals: 
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56, 135-01 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003). 
 168. See Durham, supra note 44, at 682 (commenting that the initial use of the 
streamlined procedures was used only when "certain conditions were met" but that "more 
than fifty percent of the cases received by the Board were assigned for decision by a single 
member for summary affirmance"). 
 169. See id. at 682–83 (attacking the increased streamlined procedures as efforts to 
minimalize immigration adjudications under the guise of making the hearings more 
efficient).  "During the same period, Attorney General [John] Ashcroft also used his 
statutory authority to vacate precedent decisions of the Board and issue new and binding 
decisions himself."  Id. at 683. 
 170. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(e)(4)(i), (ii).  See Rana, supra note 158, at 846–49 (arguing 
that the allowance for single-member affirmance without a written element significantly 
lessens the effectiveness of the BIA). 
 171. See id. at 833 (remarking that with the allowances for single-member decisions 
and the increased caseload, "Board members could spend no more than a few minutes on 
each case"). 
 172. See Durham, supra note 44, at 683 (explaining the questionable plan to increase 
the BIA’s effectiveness in deciding cases as well as its ability to remove its backlog by 
cutting the number of board members in half).  The dubious motivations of the reduction of 
the BIA’s size was further suggested by later revelations that those board members chosen to 
be removed "were those with essentially the most immigrant-friendly and anti-agency 
decision record on precedent cases."  Id. (citing Peter J. Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-
Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL.
1154, 1155–61 (2004)). 
 173. See generally John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why 
Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal 
Court?  An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 1, 43–51 (2005) (providing a broad analysis of the large considerable increase in the 
number of petitions for review for both the BIA and the federal courts of appeals, concluding 
that a number of factors have contributed including the revamped policies and procedures of 
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C. Current Role of Article III Courts in Reviewing Removal Decisions 
Once the respondent exhausts all available administrative remedies 
with a final decision by the BIA, the respondent facing removal may 
attempt to seek review of the final removal decision at the federal court of 
appeals in the geographically appropriate circuit court.174  Under RIDA, this 
appeal absolutely must be submitted within thirty days of the BIA’s final 
order, and failure to do so forecloses any chance of further review.175  The 
high threshold issue for every appeal is establishing the court’s jurisdiction, 
which under the language of the RIDA requires usually either a 
"constitutional claim" or a "question of law." 176  Though courts have 
understood this to bar all review of discretionary and factual 
determinations, they have not agreed beyond that, as the courts recognize 
that Congress intended to severely limit their jurisdiction but are hesitant to 
read the language as strongly as it is worded.177   Unsurprisingly, the 
confusion has engendered a circuit split, and thus despite the supposed 
uniformity of federal immigration law,178 respondents will face different 
standards of review jurisdiction depending on where their removal hearing 
took place.179
                                                                                                                 
the BIA).  The authors also posit that there has been a shift in the willingness of immigration 
lawyers and their clients to utilize judicial review as a means to challenge, perhaps even 
delay, final orders from the Department of Justice.  Id. at 85–93. 
 174. 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  The statute clearly states that the federal courts of appeals are 
generally the only means available of acquiring any type of review once the Department of 
Justice has completed its adjudications under an immigration judge and the BIA.  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(5). 
 175. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). 
 176. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  See also Seipp, supra note 57, at 1 (commenting that 
"[e]ven if the practitioner does not address the jurisdictional issue in the initial briefing of 
the case, he or she must be prepared to respond to the inevitable ‘lack of jurisdiction’ 
arguments advanced by the government or raised by the court sua sponte"). 
 177. See Moore, supra note 46, at 2047–51 (observing that although there are 
categories of decisions which are clearly factual or discretionary in nature, the courts have 
not been uniform in exactly what that dividing line is between the two); Reddy, supra note 
153, at 577–79 ("The inability of appellate courts to determine clearly those discretionary 
judgments that fall within the category of a "question of law" has not only produced 
inconsistent results among circuit courts in relief from removal cases, but has also limited 
the degree of judicial review over removal decisions."). 
 178. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish 
a uniform Rule of Naturalization."). 
 179. See Reddy, supra note 153, at 579–91 (describing the variance between different 
federal circuits in allowing certain evidentiary and credibility findings by the court of 
appeal). 
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III.  Immigration Reform 
A.  The One Agreement in Immigration Reform 
 From a much larger perspective, immigration reform is greatly needed 
simply to come to terms with immigration in the modern era and the 
realities of undocumented immigration.180  As stated by one legal scholar, 
"[t]he American immigration regime is surreal.  Twelve million human 
beings live out their lives in the United States—own property, raise 
children, pay taxes—in the absence of formal legal status."181  The current 
structure of immigration law created at the middle of the twentieth century 
remains in place, both in spirit through the preference-based system of the 
1965 Amendments182 and in fact through the continuing use of the INA as 
the framework of immigration law, but widespread uncertainty continues as 
to the functional details of that structure. 183  Ongoing debate and proposed 
legislation touches on every facet of immigration, including admissions 
standards, enforcement practices, the function of the courts, and detention 
practices.184  Despite the occasional contentiousness over the particulars, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Immigration and Immigration Law After 
9/11:  Getting It Straight, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 555, 562–66 (2009) (cataloguing the 
facts and studies on immigration in recent years and confirming that legislative reform is 
vital to restore the operability of immigration to the U.S.).  See also Lucas Guttentag, 
Immigration Reform:  A Civil Rights Issue, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 157, 158–
63 (2007) (emphasizing the continuing importance of civil rights and judicial review as 
central considerations of immigration reform); Stacy McCland, Immigration Reform and 
Agriculture:  What We Really Want, What We Really Need, and What Will Happen If They 
Leave?, 10 BARRY L. REV. 63, 78–79 (2008) (advocating for a candid evaluation of the U.S. 
agricultural industry’s dependence on immigrant labor and a legal recognition of this 
reliance). 
 181. Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow:  Fences, Raids, and the 
Production of Migrant Illegality, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 23, 25 (2009).  
Despite this extraordinary situation, the author argues that the "criminalization strategy 
[which labels all undocumented immigrants as criminals] is now firmly entrenched and 
impossible to dislodge.  Until Congress manages a normalization, ‘illegal’ migrants will 
suffer from both the social and legal marginalization that their stigma confers."  Id. at 72. 
 182. See Motomura, supra note 37, at 1936–38 (describing the lasting effect that the 
"nondiscrimination principles" of the 1965 Amendments have had on immigration policy).  
In effect, the 1965 Amendments "marked the full adoption of a basic nondiscrimination 
principle in American immigration law."  Id. at 1935. 
 183. See Vaughns, supra note 17, at 167–71 (comparing the outwardly vigorous 
immigration enforcement laws with the irregular and sometimes lenient application of those 
laws); Nafziger, supra note 180, at 562 ("Public opinion, though consistently supportive of 
immigrants, fluctuates cyclically . . . [and] Congress has typically responded . . . in cycles of 
liberality and restriction."). 
 184. See Nafziger, supra note 180, at 561–62 (observing that public opinion 
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"all observers of immigration policies agree that current system is broken 
and in desperate need of repair."185
B.  Why Reform Should Include Immigration Adjudications Generally 
Criticism towards immigration courts has come both from legal 
scholars as well as federal judges, decrying the direction in which 
immigration adjudications have been taken in terms of isolation from 
judicial review.186  On a theoretical level, judicial review stands as a 
hallmark of the overall judicial system and notions of justice.187
Unambiguous efforts to isolate the immigration courts from the federal 
judiciary cut against this principle, and though precedent allows 
Congress to control the form and function of immigration adjudication, 
it is clear that immigration adjudication has departed from the standard 
procedural safeguards of our judicial processes.188  This also contrasts 
with an immigration system whose underlying premises tend towards 
                                                                                                                 
surrounding immigration and potential reform has intensified regarding all aspects of 
immigration, especially after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and this has hindered the 
progress of reform).  Despite efforts for comprehensive legislation to confront the many 
issues plaguing immigration, there has only been a patchwork of developments which have 
primarily restricted immigration into the country, penalized immigrants within the country, 
and added criminal elements to immigration.  Id. at 562–63. 
 185. Vaughns, supra note 17, at 151.  Compare Lucas Guttentag, Immigration and 
American Values:  Some Initial Steps for a New Administration, HUM. RTS. MAG., Fall 2008, 
at 10 ("Major legislation to restore fairness, credibility, and accountability is essential."), 
with Asa Hutchinson, Holes in the Fence:  Immigration Reform and Border Security in the 
United States, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 536 (2007) ("The rule of law must prevail . . . [and] 
we must concentrate on the security side, the enforcement side, the side of integrity."). 
 186. See Rana, supra note 158, at 834 (explaining that recent changes to immigration 
adjudication have led to more appeals to the Courts of Appeals, and "courts in every circuit 
[in 2006] began issuing scathing critiques of the quality of the agency’s decision making and 
the lacks of its adherence to basic principles of the rules of law"). 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 839 (noting that external judicial review "has customarily served 
the function of ensuring that an agency is complying with its own regulations while carrying 
out congressional intent").  The author adds that the importance of judicial review is 
magnified in the context of immigration removal hearings due to the highly punitive nature 
of deportation.  Id.
 188. See Rana, supra note 158, at 859–64 (describing the effect that RIDA and 
streamlining have had on appellate court review of immigration matters as having 
"surreptitiously expanded the zone of untouchable agency decision making"); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:  Immigration and Judicial 
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1630–31 (2000) (suggesting that limits on judicial review in 
the realm of immigration adjudications risk a loss of independence from enforcement and a 
loss of the courts of appeals’ more diverse experience on which to base its analysis). 
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fairness.189  Admittedly, the legislation of 1961 and 1965 were created in 
different circumstances, especially in terms of the undocumented 
population, yet their principles should continue to apply. 
From a practical standpoint, limited judicial review also produces 
questionable legal proceedings.  Federal judges have candidly critiqued 
immigration court decisions that have come before them on review, 
disparaging the lack of quality that they must contend with on review.190
Administrative courts are under Congress’s control and located within 
the executive branch, yet they still are part of the U.S. court system and 
thus should conform to its high standards.  Furthermore, given the recent 
streamlining changes to the Immigration Court adjudications, the risk of 
injustice arguably has increased.191  In fact, the streamlining efforts 
themselves may even have helped increase petitions for review from the 
BIA.192  Though Congress and the Department of Justice have made 
their position on their unreviewability clear, it is not in the nature of the 
U.S. federal government to exclude a branch from the normal functions 
of government. 
Certainly the measures taken to streamline the immigration 
adjudications are not wholly without merit, and the advantages offered 
must be acknowledged.  Without challenging long-standing precedent, 
Congress has essentially unrestrained control over all facets of 
immigration and naturalization, thus making judicial review a policy 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2968 (1961) (recognizing that aliens seeking 
review of administrative orders should be given a full and fair opportunity to do so).  See 
also supra Part D (establishing the foundation for the 1965 Amendments, which included 
recognizing the inevitable need for judicial review and the embrace of racial fairness). 
 190. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) 
("[A]djudication of [immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the 
minimum standards of legal justice.").  Written by Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit, the opinion also stated that "it cannot be in the interest of the immigration 
authorities, the taxpayer, the federal judiciary, or citizens concerned with the effective 
enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws for removal orders to be routinely nullified by 
the courts . . . ."  Id.
 191. See Rana, supra note 158, at 859–64 (observing that the combined effect of RIDA 
and streamlined adjudication procedures have meant that reviewing courts of appeals often 
have less information on which to base their analysis). 
 192. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 173, at 29–32 (concluding that the 
streamlining procedures prompted respondents in immigration hearings to seek external 
review as the administrative appeals process left them unsatisfied).  The authors also note 
that the Department of Justice has taken the counter-position "that people are appealing BIA 
decisions at a higher rate simply to delay being expelled in the face of more prompt BIA 
decisions."  Id. at 31. 
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question as opposed to a legal question.193  Curtailing judicial review 
also conserves judicial resources and accelerates immigration 
removals.194  Nevertheless, the immigration system still forms part of 
our national policy, and should not be excused from either the principles 
underlying both our national standards of justice and the modern 
immigration system. 
C.  Why Reform Should Specifically Include Habeas Corpus 
"[A] serious Suspension Clause issue would arise if the 1996 
statutes have withdrawn that power [to issue a writ of habeas corpus] 
from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute."195  So wrote 
the St. Cyr Supreme Court in 2001, finding that Congress had not clearly 
removed habeas corpus review in the immigration context.196  Thus the 
question now becomes if Congress followed those instructions when it 
passed the jurisdiction-stripping RIDA in 2005 and provided an 
adequate substitute.197  This Note contends that Congress failed to do 
this judged by recent developments in habeas corpus law, and that 
Congress should return to long-held principles still contained within the 
immigration system and fully restore the respondent’s right to seek a 
petition of habeas corpus. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush198
established what had long been lacking in habeas corpus 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See supra Part IA (discussing the plenary power of Congress over immigration 
policy). 
 194. See Moore, supra note 46, at 2059–60 (proposing that the main argument for 
limitations on judicial review in immigration adjudications is the conservation of judicial 
resources and the acceleration of immigration enforcement operations). 
 195. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001). 
 196. See id. at 314 (concluding that "the absence of such a forum [to provide adequate 
habeas review], coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of 
congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration" indicates that Congress had not 
removed habeas corpus review for any immigration respondents). 
 197. See Norako, supra note 124 (arguing that RIDA was Congress’s direct answer to 
the St. Cyr case, and was thus crafted with the St. Cyr’s decision in mind). 
 198. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 777–87 (2008) (finding that the reach of 
the Constitution includes militant detainees held at an overseas military compound and that 
the detainees therefore possessed the right to petition for habeas corpus review).  In 
Boumediene, the Court considered whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 forbade 
federal courts from considering writs of habeas corpus.  Id. at 735–36.  Because the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution applied to the Military Commissions Act, the Court 
looked to determine whether Congress had provided petitioners with an adequate substitute 
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jurisprudence:  a definition.199  In so doing, the Court therefore 
promulgated the closest approximation to a bright-line rule for 
determining what is required for a habeas corpus substitute.200  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the availability of the 
writ is not static but accommodates each particular circumstance.201  At 
a minimum, it requires "a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he 
is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of 
relevant law."202  The Court added that where the detention comes as a 
result of executive detention, and thus without the procedural guarantees 
inherent to a full court trial, habeas review takes on an even more 
important role.203  In the words of the Court:  "Habeas corpus 
proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention 
is by executive order.  But the writ must be effective.  The habeas court 
must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both 
the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain."204
Applying this standard to RIDA, the law simply does not suffice.  
The relevant language of RIDA, "constitutional claims and questions of 
law," appears at first glance to meet the requirements, as it grants 
jurisdiction for legal attacks on detention.205  The Boumediene Court, 
however, did not simply require that there be an allowance for review; 
                                                                                                                 
for the habeas writ.  Id. at 765–71.  The Court determined  that the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 did not provide adequate substitute for the habeas writ.  Id. at 784–94. 
 199. See Norako, supra note 124, at 1617–18 ("Despite the significance of the writ, 
courts have struggled in defining its exact scope and purpose.").  The writ of habeas corpus 
was largely only defined as a means to challenge executive detention, but remained unclear 
on the specific requirements for such a challenge.  Id.  "Our case law does not contain 
extensive discussion of standards defining suspension of the writ or of circumstances under 
which suspension has occurred."  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772–73. 
 200. Id. at 1626–28 (describing the vague contours established by the Boumediene
Court in setting out what constitutes sufficient habeas review, noting that the determination 
is highly case-sensitive). 
 201. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 778–79 (describing "common-law habeas corpus" as 
"an adaptable remedy [whose] precise application and scope changed depending upon the 
circumstances"). 
 202. Id. at 2266 (emphasis added). 
 203. Id. at 783 (realizing that executive detention is not as constrained as criminal 
detention is by limits on duration and requirements of procedure; thus, greater checks are 
required in order to protect the detainee). 
 204. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) ("Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any 
other provision of this chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be 
construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law . . . ." (emphasis 
added)). 
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instead, the Court characterized this review as "effective" and 
"meaningful."206  It is these heightened standards which disqualify the 
judicial review under RIDA from being a sufficient replacement for 
habeas corpus review.207  First of all, the court of appeals judge must 
depend on the administrative record for all factual determinations, and 
has very limited ability to either reconsider such factual findings or 
accept new evidence from the respondent.208  Second, the strict thirty-
day time limit placed on appeals risks the right to habeas corpus review, 
as the detained respondent must receive the final order, obtain the 
assistance of a lawyer, and that lawyer must file the writ, all within 
thirty days.209  Finally, one of the effects of the recent streamlining 
procedures has been the rise of single-member affirmations without a 
written opinion.210  Such a procedure leaves a reviewing judge with less 
to consider and obscures the reasoning of the immigration courts as well 
as the BIA.211  The provisions for judicial review contained within RIDA 
fail to meet the requirements for habeas corpus review as explained by 
the Boumediene Court, as the reviewing judge’s analysis is limited to an 
ambiguous record which can only be challenged during the first thirty 
days of detention.  Since evidentiary errors, subsequent factual 
developments, and prolonged detention should form part of an effective 
and meaningful habeas review, congressional action is required to 
amend this disparity. 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783. 
 207. See Norako, supra note 124, at 1640–47 (presenting argument against the 
sufficiency of RIDA as valid replacement for writ of habeas corpus). 
 208. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(4)(A), (B).  See Norako, supra note 124, at 1640–44 
(contending that the general inability of a reviewing court to modify or supplement the 
evidence precludes the judge from providing a meaningful review). 
 209. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  See Norako, supra note 124, at 1644–47 (suggesting that 
such a short time-frame easily causes unfair results where the respondent is the innocent 
victim of delayed decisions and deliveries of final orders). 
 210. See Durham, supra note 44, at 659–60 (commenting that "appeals are now 
routinely heard by single members" and that there has been a "proliferation of ‘affirmance 
without opinion’ decisions").  See also supra Part III.B (explaining the origins and process 
of the streamlining efforts and reduced involvement of the BIA). 
 211. See Rana, supra note 158, at 849 (explaining that the streamlining procedures 
often prevents a reviewing court of appeals from understanding the BIA’s ground for 
summary affirmance, thus leaving the court of appeals only with the record from the 
immigration judge). 
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IV.  Larger Examination of What is Needed for Reform—Looking 
Backwards and Forwards 
A.  Immigration Reform Must Consider Immigration Broadly 
Immigration reform must take into evaluation the current 
circumstances and current laws and regulations in order to best decide 
what to do next.  However, the current legal structure rests squarely on a 
history of civil liberties that first became clearly apparent with the 
Immigration Act of 1965 and the political and social developments of 
that time.212  Immigration reform therefore is not simply a matter of 
economic arguments and population numbers.  There are broader policy 
considerations that also form part of our national rhetoric.213  Though 
historically our immigration policy has not been viewed as constrained 
by the language of our Constitution,214 constitutional principles should 
form part of our consideration.215  These were the impulses that drove 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 286–87 ("During the Sixties era, the federal 
government acted decisively to create national standards of justice that greatly expanded 
legal protections for racial and ethnic minorities and for women.").  However, these 
developments are certainly not the final declaration on civil rights—"[a]s in the 1960s, 
Americans continue to debate the limits of individual liberty, community rights, the rights of 
minorities, and the use of public versus private power to make the United States a just 
society." Id.
 213. See Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS 3, 19–21 
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) ("The social disabilities [levied against 
immigrants] are unconstitutional because they create a social structure that is inconsistent 
with the conception of community embodied in the Constitution.").  The author draws a clear 
distinction between social disabilities, which consist of limits on the basic elements of 
participation in a civic community such as housing, employment, and basic necessities, and 
political disabilities, which consist of limits on the involvement in the organization and 
control of that community.  Id. at 4–7.  He then concludes that the Constitution contains an 
"antisubjugation principle," embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which 
directs the United States to not "subjugate immigrants, not because we owe them anything, 
but to preserve our society as a community of equals."  Id. at 17.  
 214. See NEUMAN, supra note 19, at 119–34 (arguing that the fundamental powers of 
the United States as a sovereign and under the Constitution do not provide conclusively the 
ability to exclude migrants from its territory, but that universal individual rights, including 
the freedom of movement, provide at least a narrow right of access to the country).   
 215. See Robin West, A Moral Responsibility, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS 63, 66–67 
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) (furthering the belief that, in addition to the 
Courts, "the [American] people and their representatives" possess an obligation mandated by 
the Constitution to not subjugate immigrants socially).  The author describes the 
Constitution as "the expression and embodiment of our egalitarian and communitarian better 
selves:  it presents and imposes our defining conception of social justice—at once liberal 
egalitarian, respectful of individuals and mindful or our communitarian natures—and it 
embodies, expresses, and enforces our political morality."  Id.
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reform in the 1960s and which continue to be interwoven in our 
immigration policy, but which have since receded as reform debates 
have focused single-mindedly on discrete sections of immigration 
policy.216
The abandonment in 1965 of the national origins system in favor of 
a system designed to reunite families and recognize skilled or otherwise 
valuable immigrants was a decision that has had enormous ramifications 
for the contemporary United States.217  Statistical evidence suggests that 
the new system triggered a surge of immigration, and for the last three 
decades political reactions have attempted to alleviate the effects of this 
shift through legislative changes.218  In attempting to modify the 
immigration system, however, these new laws have reached too far, 
challenging the very ideals that pushed the country towards a 
preference-based system half a century ago.  This departure is evidenced 
by the ever-tightening restrictions on judicial review, most recently the 
elimination of full habeas corpus review for removal orders.219  In 
addition to a commitment to these enduring principles, the benefits of 
judicial involvement should not be underestimated, and an evaluation of 
the transformations that took place in criminal procedure in the 1960s 
provides an explanation for this. 
B.  Criminal Procedure Revolution 
The same era that produced the 1961 and 1965 Amendments also 
gave rise to the famed, if not infamous, "criminal procedure 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 226 (describing the current immigration 
scheme as "an exceptionally rigid legal regime . . . riven with discretionary executive 
authority, and increasingly immune from meaningful oversight"); Boswell, supra note 33, at 
332 ("[T]he 1965 Amendments were regarded as groundbreaking because the legislation 
dismantled a legacy of discriminatory immigration policy [yet] . . . [i]n retrospect, it appears 
that the 1965 Amendments have been the last positive immigration reform of the twentieth 
century."). 
 217. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 112–16 (explaining the policy behind the 
Immigration Act of 1965 and its effect on immigration policy). 
 218. See id. at 118–89 (providing a comprehensive overview of developments 
subsequent to the 1965 Amendments, including the ramp-up of immigration numerically, 
increased global political issues involving immigration, and culminating in the increasingly 
complex issue of undocumented immigration). 
 219. See supra Parts II.C, III.C (discussing, respectively, the effect of RIDA on habeas 
corpus and the questionable constitutionality of RIDA in removing habeas review without 
providing a sufficient replacement). 
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revolution" (Revolution), accomplished by the U.S. Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice Earl Warren.220  Though the transformations in 
both immigration and criminal procedure can be traced to 
developments predating the social movements of the 1960s, both also 
are inextricably linked to this remarkable decade.221  And though the 
Revolution is a consortium of "hundreds of criminal procedure cases" 
whereas the 1961 and 1965 Amendments are simply two instances of 
federal legislation,222 the policy choices reflected in each share a 
common foundation in the broader political advances of the 1960s.223
The Revolution represented an influential turning point in 
criminal procedure law that continues to have an important impact on 
the daily functions of the U.S. criminal system.224  These relatively 
rapid changes to criminal procedure law were strongly criticized by 
some at the time and arguably even swayed major elections,225  and 
some of the major components, such as the evidential exclusionary 
rule, remain controversial.226  Yet, the enduring nature of many of the 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT:  JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND 
LEGACY 157 (2001) (describing the two main goals of the Warren Court in the area of 
criminal procedure as ensuring basic procedures for all citizens regardless of resources and 
applying the "spirit" of the Constitution instead of the "wording").  But see JOHN DENTON 
CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION:  A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM 112–20 (1973) (criticizing the Warren Court’s judicial philosophy as incorrectly 
being interpreted to favor only a small segment of the population). 
 221. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 446 
(2000) (drawing a political connection between the Revolution and the concurrent effort to 
confront poverty and other systemic problems stemming from race); see also BRIGGS, supra
note 35, at 106–07 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act fostered the political climate necessary 
for immigration reform). 
 222. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?  Rethinking the Warren 
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2004). 
 223. See A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, in THE WARREN 
COURT:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 58, 65 (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds., 1968) (noting that the 
Revolution is best comprehended by evaluating it in the context of the broader civil rights 
movement); see also BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106–07 (observing that the principles 
prohibiting racial discrimination against citizens logically led to prohibiting racial 
discrimination in national immirgration policy).
 224. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 146–47 (1997) (referring to the Warren Court’s rulings in criminal procedure as 
"a remarkable edifice of Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment 
rules" as well as "the foundations of modern constitutional criminal procedure"). 
 225. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE:  A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 497–500 (1997) 
(noting that during the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon unequivocally and 
successfully ran against the criminal procedure rulings of the Warren Court, claiming that 
the Warren Court "weakened law and encouraged criminals"). 
 226. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ITS HISTORY AND 
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practices promoted by the Warren Court indicates their permanence in 
the legal system, as some of the obligatory procedures have since 
become deeply ingrained in police and judicial operations across the 
nation.227  This regularity has in turn fostered greater confidence in the 
court system to produce fair results.228  Furthermore, a general public 
acceptance of these constitutional judgments suggests a common 
acknowledgement of their reasoning.229  The reliance on the Bill of 
Rights resonates with a common understanding of the relationship 
between the individual and the government.230
In comparison to the ongoing uncertainty of immigration law, the 
Revolution presents a relatively stable authority.  It is this degree of 
stability that offers guidance for potential immigration reform, 
especially regarding the benefits of judicial involvement.  If such 
reform can achieve results comparable to those of the Revolution, then 
immigration law may finally achieve the steadiness that it has long 
been lacking.  The most effective manner in which to accomplish this 
is a return to the policies that shaped immigration legislation in the 
1960s, including a restoration of judicial review to its former levels. 
                                                                                                                 
INTERPRETATION 609–12 (2008) (explaining the basic shape of the current exclusionary rule 
but noting that there are continued calls to remove the exclusionary rule in place of remedies 
less harsh towards law enforcement); WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH:  WHY OUR 
SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO 
DO TO REBUILD IT 33–45 (1999) (arguing that the exclusionary rule harmfully imports the 
antagonism of the courtroom into the practices of police enforcement, and that courts should 
be more flexible in allowing evidence). 
 227. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect:  Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING
191, 191–95 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (arguing that the Miranda 
warnings enjoy "acceptance across a broad spectrum" and that police officers have both 
adopted the warnings and adapted to them).
 228. See JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT:  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA 107 (1992) (characterizing the 
Warren Court as emphasizing "fairness, equity, and the presumption of innocence above the 
crime control model that espoused efficiency, finality, and the presumption of guilt"). 
 229. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 270–77 
(explaining that many of the Warren Court’s first landmark cases in criminal procedure were 
viewed positively by the public, embodying "equal justice for all, the furthering of national 
values against foot-dragging states, [and] the Court acting because others would not"). 
 230. See Pye, supra note 223, at 62 (commenting on "the disparity between the reality 
of the criminal process and the ideals of civilized conduct to which we as a nation had sworn 
allegiance"). 
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i.  Description of the Criminal Procedure Revolution 
Prior to the Revolution’s standardization of criminal procedure, 
criminal law generally was a state matter.231  Owing mainly to federalism 
concerns and traditional practices, the vast majority of criminal defendants 
only came into contact with state laws:  "More than 99 percent of all 
prosecutions were brought in the state systems.  In those cases, both the 
Court’s pronouncements and the Constitution were largely irrelevant." 232
Consequently, the procedures allowed to a criminal defendant depended 
entirely on the state constitutions and legislatures, as the protections offered 
in the Bill of Rights constrained only the federal government.233  The 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the requirement of due 
process for the states nominally gave the federal courts an instrument 
through which they could ensure the most basic individual protections at 
the state level.234  For decades, however, this supervision only triggered 
remedial rulings where the state court disregarded the "fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions."235  In effect, this standard required extreme violations 
by state courts to provoke the Court’s intervention, such as the unjust trial 
overturned in Powell v. Alabama,236 and was administered unpredictably 
through a case-by-case analysis.237
                                                                                                                 
 231. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953–1969 
218–19 (2005) (describing the near-absolute control the individual states possessed over 
their respective criminal laws and procedures prior to the middle of the twentieth century). 
 232. Id. at 218. 
 233. See UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 158 (noting that the Supreme Court declared in 
1833 that the Bill of Rights "applied only against the federal government, and this remained 
the accepted interpretation until after the Civil War"). 
 234. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218–19 (arguing that the initial interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court as applied to state criminal proceedings 
was very loose and allowed the states great independence and flexibility). 
 235. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 
312, 316 (1926)). 
 236. Id. (holding that Alabama’s refusal to appoint competent counsel for eight 
African-American defendants tried for rape charges was a denial of due process).  In Powell,
the defendants were arrested and at trial the judge "appointed all the members of the bar" to 
represent the defendants.  Id. at 49.  A jury sentenced the defendants to death.  Id. at 50.  The 
Court found that the attorney who finally represented Defendants had no opportunity to 
prepare or investigate the case.  Id. at 57–58.  The Court then analyzed the history of the 
right to counsel and the history of incorporating the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 59–70.  The Court held that courts must appoint counsel in capital cases 
when the defendant cannot afford counsel and is incapable of a pro se defense.  Id. at 71. 
 237. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 219 (explaining the unpredictability and gradual 
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This adaptive process continued through the early years of the Warren 
Court.238  Beginning in the mid-1950s, however, egalitarian sentiments 
began to emerge in some of its rulings,239 and in 1959 the Court’s new 
direction surfaced with the decision in Frank v. Maryland.240  "The 
controversy ignited by [these early decisions] foreshadowed larger storms 
that would swirl around the Court . . . as it labored to bring criminal 
procedure in line with changes in American legal culture."241  This 
alignment most clearly materialized in Mapp v. Ohio,242 in which the 
exclusionary rule was brought to bear against the states by applying the 
federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.243  Although this "selective incorporation" of 
constitutional rights had actually commenced decades earlier,244 it was not 
                                                                                                                 
process by which the Bill of Rights were applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 238. See Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren’s Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement 
Affected His Work as Chief Justice, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT:  THE 
LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 91, 91–92 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007) 
(identifying Chief Justice Warren’s preliminary outlook on criminal procedure as being 
particularly affected by his personal history in law enforcement and desire to uphold high 
standards). 
 239. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (ruling that due process requires that 
any state which provides for appellate review must not discriminate against any defendant, 
here for refusing to supply indigent defendants with a copy of the trial transcript); Mallory v. 
U.S., 354 U.S. 449, 455–56 (1957) (holding that interrogation of a defendant for many hours 
and refusing to arraign the defendant before a magistrate judge constitutes a due process 
violation). 
 240. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372–73 (1959) (holding that Baltimore 
could impose a fine on its residents who resist inspection of their house by health inspectors 
pursuant to a city ordinance),  In Frank, a health inspector, unable to gain access to a 
residence, observed unsanitary conditions and called police, who then obtained a warrant 
and arrested the resident.  Id. at 361–62.  The Court reasoned that the need for regulation of 
sanitary living conditions justified the city ordinance and that the inspection did not rise to a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 371–72. 
 241. BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 226. 
 242. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (ruling that evidence must be 
excluded in a state criminal case where it is the product of warrantless search).  In Mapp,
police officers forced entry into a home after the resident insisted she would only open the 
door for a search warrant, which the police lacked.  Id. at 644.  The Court reviewed the 
history of the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
at 650–54.  Finding that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States and the Federal 
Government, the Court concluded that the States are also subject to the exclusionary rule.  
Id. at 654. 
 243. See id. at 654 (extending the exclusionary rule against the states). 
 244. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (declining to invalidate a state 
law limiting inciting language under the First Amendment, but establishing the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a method through which the Bill of Rights could apply to the states).  The 
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until Mapp that the Court began incorporating the federal criminal 
procedural protections in earnest.245  The ruling launched an unprecedented 
wave of cases that came to be known as the criminal procedure 
revolution,246 including Gideon v. Wainwright,247 Miranda v. Arizona,248
Escobedo v. Illinois,249 Malloy v. Hogan,250 Katz v. United States,251 and 
many others.252  "By the time Warren retired from the Supreme Court in 
1969, a district attorney had to be an expert on constitutional law."253
Chief Justice Warren, himself a former state prosecutor, viewed 
stricter controls on law enforcement as ultimately beneficial for their 
operations.254  More important, however, "was the disparity between the 
reality of the criminal process and the ideals of civilized conduct to which 
                                                                                                                 
Court’s precise and rather clear language concerning the applicability of the Fourteenth 
Amendment against the states:  "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom 
of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment 
by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."  Id.
 245. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 231 (describing the impact of Mapp as an 
"incorporation breakthrough"). 
 246. See Pye, supra note 223, at 58 (noting in the years immediately following the 
Revolution that "whether these changes constitute a ‘criminal law revolution’ or merely an 
orderly evolution towards the application of civilized standards to the trial of persons 
accused of crime"). 
 247. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (establishing the requirement 
under the Sixth Amendment for a state to furnish legal counsel for certain criminal 
defendants who cannot otherwise afford it). 
 248. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding that evidence 
obtained from a criminal defendant through police interrogation without a full advisement of 
the criminal’s rights is inadmissible under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).  
 249. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (expanding the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to include the right to have legal counsel present during police 
interrogations). 
 250. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that an individual’s Fifth 
Amendment right against forced self-incrimination also protected the individual during state 
criminal trials). 
 251. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment to protect against warrantless searches where there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, regardless of whether there was physical intrusion). 
 252. See Pye, supra note 223, 58–77 (surveying the cases constituting the criminal 
procedure revolution and noting the unprecedented nature of the rulings and their probable 
and lasting impact). 
 253. BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218. 
 254. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN:  A PUBLIC LIFE 263 (1982) (describing the 
strict view and high standards that Chief Justice Warren maintained towards law 
enforcement personnel from his time spent in the profession in California). 
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we as a nation had sworn allegiance."255  Despite the conventional 
deference shown towards the states regarding criminal law, the Court now 
required the states and their criminal procedure laws to meet the minimal 
standards of the Constitution.256  The Revolution predictably encountered 
resistance from segments of a heavily divided populace, even prompting 
Congress in one instance to attempt to legislatively reverse the Court.257
For parts of the country, the Revolution formed yet another part of a series 
of unsupported and destabilizing cases.258
Despite the controversy, however, the Revolution was no more than an 
element of the political and social landscape of the time—"[t]he Court’s 
concern with criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of 
the struggle for civil rights."259  In the view of Chief Justice Warren, crime 
had become urbanized and driven by poverty,260 and coupled with this was 
the evident reality that minorities endured most of the illegitimate police 
behavior.261  Encouraged by the national mood as well as the specific 
efforts of many states to improve their criminal procedure laws, the Court 
demanded judicial regularity based on the federal model for all criminals 
across the nation.262  "If government was going to deprive some of its 
                                                                                                                 
 255. Pye, supra note 223, at 62. 
 256. See Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State 
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 802 (2009) (explaining that without the Supreme 
Court’s "aggressive" efforts during the 1960s, "it is possible that many of the modern 
reforms of state criminal justice systems would never have occurred"). 
 257. See POWE, supra note 221, at 409–10 (describing the legally questionably efforts 
by Congress in 1968 to undermine the Miranda warnings by legislatively restoring the pre-
Miranda legal structure). 
 258. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 229, at 274–77 (arguing that changes in crime rates and 
unrelated shifts in public opinion caused the Revolution to appear less appealing in the latter 
half of the 1960s). 
 259. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (arguing that the growing consensus regarding 
greater equality throughout society made criminal rights an inevitable target of reform). 
 260. See WHITE, supra note 254, at 264–66 (contrasting the typical criminal of the 
1950s with that of the 1960s, the latter being the product of impoverished and otherwise 
disadvantaged situations). 
 261. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (emphasizing the role that the African-American 
civil rights movement has in terms of exposing the relationship between minorities generally 
and law enforcement).  "If the Court’s espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, 
it required not only that the poor Negro be permitted to vote and to attend a school with 
whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as well as 
possess, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime."  Id.
 262. See id. at 63 (commenting that the Revolution’s application of federal standards 
against the states necessarily drew on Supreme Court decisions that long predated the 
Warren Court). 
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citizens of their liberty and their humanity, it was at least going to 
effectuate that deprivation fairly."263
ii.  Legacy of the Revolution 
In the decades following the Revolution, which effectively ended in 
1969,264 the fundamental progress made by the Warren Court remained 
intact.265  Though subsequent Courts declined to expand on the 
developments and even chipped away at some of them,266 the criminal 
justice system now clearly displayed the design of the Revolution’s central 
precepts.  Critics denounced the Warren Court for stepping beyond the 
bounds of the court’s role,267 yet the core intent of the Revolution was to 
secure "compliance with the fundamental ideals of equality and fairness 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution."268  Indeed, the broader aim 
of many of the Warren Court’s judgments was simply to uphold the 
Constitution.269  Apart from the debate over the Court’s methodology, 
                                                                                                                 
 263. WHITE, supra note 254, at 265. 
 264. See ANTHONY E. SCUDELLARI ET AL., Introduction to THE CRIMINAL LAW 
REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, at v (Bureau of National Affairs, 1975) (suggesting that 
June 23, 1969 was "the last day of the ‘Warren Court’ era" because on that date the Court 
delivered its final case in which it applied a Bill of Rights provision against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment).  The case was Benton v. Maryland, which incorporated 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 787 (1969) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 265. See Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 802 (listing the numerous criminal 
procedures which "we all take for granted today," including protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the right to appointed counsel, and the right to confront witnesses 
among others). 
 266. See Kamisar, supra note 238, at 112 ("Since the Warren Court’s revolution in 
criminal procedure came to an end, most of the famous cases that marked the revolution 
have been . . . read narrowly, applied grudgingly, and riddled with exceptions by the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts."). 
 267. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 221, at 395 (describing the reaction to the Miranda
decision as including surprise at the legislative nature of the opinion and its lack of firm 
constitutional underpinnings). 
 268. Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 801. 
 269. See Harry N. Scheiber, The Warren Court, American Law, and Modern Legal 
Cultures, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT:  THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND 
FOREIGN LAW 1, 2 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007) (positing that the Warren Court merely 
"brought to the forefront" the constitutional standards which had long been ignored by 
states). 
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however, "subsequent Courts have and will continue to function in the 
shadow of the Warren Court legacy."270
iii.  Similarities Between Immigration Law and the Criminal Procedure 
Revolution 
The circumstances faced by the Revolution in the 1960s bear a strong 
resemblance to the conditions which have frustrated recent efforts at 
immigration reform.  First, both contend with an established system of law 
whose functions are central to the nation’s affairs.  The Revolution altered 
the procedures of criminal adjudications, which go to a core responsibility 
of government, the criminal justice system.271  Immigration reform must 
deal with the admittance and administration of migrants into the nation, an 
issue of significant proportions for the immigrant-rich United States.  
Second, both the Revolution and immigration reform attempt to ameliorate 
harsh enforcement practices by government actors.  The unrestrained 
conduct of state and local police agents served as the primary inspiration for 
the Revolution,272 yet had long been protected from federal parameters due 
to federalism.273  Immigration reform will likely seek to restrain the high-
profile enforcement methods employed by federal agencies, such as 
workplace raids, as well as the less visible but equally severe practices, 
such as long-term detention.  Third, there are strong racial undertones 
within both systems of law.  The criminal justice system notoriously treated 
defendants differently based on their race, and this discrepancy was a 
motivating force behind the Revolution.274  The explicit racism that molded 
the worldwide immigration quota system was legislatively removed in 
1965, but immigration reform will have to confront the implicit racism that 
                                                                                                                 
 270. UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 254. 
 271. See id. (suggesting that part of the lasting effect of the Warren Court was its 
willingness to confront "big themes that are of great importance to modern society"). 
 272. See Kamisar, supra note 238, at 91–92 (arguing that Chief Justice Warren’s years 
in the criminal enforcement field instilled a drive to uphold rigorous policing methods 
devoid of "any trickiness or any unfairness"). 
 273. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218–19 (explaining the initial hesitance of the 
Supreme Court during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to become overly 
involved in the states’ systems of criminal law). 
 274. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (linking the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
rulings with the African-American civil rights movement).  See also Lain, supra note 222, at 
1451–52 (suggesting that the Warren Court’s progressive stance on criminal procedure 
reflected the growing support of racial equality in the country as a whole). 
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continues to seep into immigration law and policy.275  Fourth, the political 
environment for both was and is intense and highly partisan.  The Warren 
Court had already caused massive controversy around the country with 
rulings in other areas of law, and only fanned the flames with its criminal 
procedure opinions.276  Similarly, immigration reform tackles an issue that 
is historically divisive as well as presently gridlocked because of the 
entrenched positions of the many political factions involved.  Finally, both 
involve federal decisions which strongly and disproportionately affect the 
states.  The Revolution encountered a bewildering array of state law and 
attempted to elevate those lacking the minimal procedural protections to 
proper levels.277  Immigration reform will possibly redraft immigration 
standards and procedures, which would consequently affect immigration 
movement and populations within the states, especially in those states with 
the highest immigrant populations. 
Criminal procedure and immigration law underwent dramatic 
transformations during the middle of the twentieth century which contrasted 
with their mutually pervasive and persistent problems with class and racial 
discrimination.278  The large-scale social upheaval of the 1960s reverberated 
far past the predominant movements of black civil rights and anti-war 
beliefs.279  It promulgated novel legal standards that are clearly seen in the 
Revolution and in the 1961 and 1965 Amendments.280  Nevertheless, while 
many of the basic principles put forward within the Revolution have 
                                                                                                                 
 275. See JOHNSON, MYTH, supra note 11, at 1–54 (charting the evolution of 
immigration policy as a direct reflection of race, and noting that "people of color from 
developing nations are the most likely group to be excluded from the United States"). 
 276. See David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 845, 868–75 (2007) (placing the Revolution’s seminal cases within the larger 
controversy surrounding the Warren Court, partly from the school desegregation cases, 
which mainly focused on the Court acting without constitutional support). 
 277. See Lain, supra note 222, at 1371–72 (observing that the state criminal justice 
systems prior to the Revolution varied widely since there were only minimal benchmarks 
required by the Supreme Court prior to the Warren Court). 
 278. See JOHNSON, MYTH, supra note 11, at 2 (noting the issues of race present in 
immigration law); Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (observing the entwinement of criminal 
procedures and race). 
 279. See WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 420 (noting the effect of the Civil Rights movement 
on other social movements). 
 280. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 ("Concern with civil rights almost inevitably 
required attention to the rights of defendants in criminal cases."); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 
106 ("For to invoke in legislation the explicit principle that overt racism could not be 
tolerated in the treatment of citizens implicitly meant that there could not be overt 
discrimination in the nation’s laws governing the way future citizens would be considered 
for admission as immigrants."). 
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matured into bedrock legal principles over time, immigration law did not 
gain such stability.281  Thus, while the Revolution and current immigration 
reform share many characteristics, the most salient disparity is the 
contrasting evolvement after their mutual renovations in the 1960s.  If 
immigration reform can import the relevant features of the Revolution, 
however, it may also be able to attain comparable constancy. 
C.  Applying the Criminal Procedure Revolution to Immigration Reform 
The durability of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings rests 
with three achievements of the Revolution:  the institution of standard 
enforcement practices,282 an increased public faith in the criminal justice 
system,283 and the realization of Constitutional promises.284  These 
accomplishments, much like the Revolution’s motivations, are directly 
linked to the more visible public priorities of the 1960s.285  First, the 
federalization of criminal procedure provided national standards which 
applied equally throughout the states.286  This regularity was chiefly aimed 
at the South, "where racial prejudice fueled already hostile sentiment 
toward those accused of criminal wrongdoing."287  Beyond this, the 
guidelines also aspired to refine police methods and encourage better 
                                                                                                                 
 281. See supra Part I.E (discussing the major legislative changes which have occurred 
during the last half century). 
 282. See WHITE, supra note 254, at 272 (portraying the Supreme Court’s rationale for 
the Revolution as partly to produce strong standards for police to guarantee "more 
enlightened law enforcement"); Lain, supra note 221, at 1369–72 (describing the shift of 
power from the state governments to the federal government in controlling criminal 
adjudications throughout the nation). 
 283. See UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 254 (noting the Warren Court’s long-standing 
and influential criminal procedure decisions). 
 284. See id. at 157 (crediting the Revolution with aligning the rights embodied in the 
Constitution with proper law enforcement practices). 
 285. See supra Part I.D (presenting briefly the larger social and political movements of 
the era). 
 286. See supra note 282 (explaining the success of the Revolution in instituting 
standard enforcement practices). 
 287. See Lain, supra note 222, at 1371–72 (illustrating the particularly hostile attitudes 
towards minority criminal defendants in the southern states).  "[D]efendants were routinely 
treated like pieces of meat to be processed and then forwarded for proper packaging.  Police 
plucked individuals off the streets for little or no reason, searched them without a warrant, 
questioned them using strong-arm tactics, and then (if sufficiently satisfied with the evidence 
of guilt) sent them on to the formal adjudication process for trial or, more likely, a guilty 
plea."  Id.
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practices nation-wide.288  Second, in the face of increasing criminal 
prosecutions, the Court recognized a growing dissatisfaction with the 
criminal justice system.289  "[T]he Supreme Court . . . recognized that the 
nation was in the midst of a social revolution before this became apparent 
to most of the elected representatives of the people and . . . sought to 
eliminate the basic defects in our [criminal justice] system."290  Though the 
Revolution has inspired mixed reactions since its deployment, considerable 
scholarship exists crediting it with constructive improvements to criminal 
justice.291  Third, the Revolution delivered on Constitutional protections 
which had long been denied to citizens.292  Despite the legal rationality of 
federalism and the traditional deference to state control over criminal law, 
"the implementation of constitutional rights which [had] existed only in 
theory in the past" resonated with the public.293  The initial influence and 
lasting appeal of the Court, and the Revolution in particular, derive 
principally from this unabashed loyalty to the "principles of fairness and 
equality that were part of the ethical structure of the Constitution."294  More 
importantly, the guiding philosophy remains viable today as a valid 
understanding of the Constitution’s checks on the state’s enforcement 
powers.295
                                                                                                                 
 288. See POWE, supra note 221, at 492 (remarking that the Revolution was to ensure 
proper police methods not only in "backwater" regions but in every state of the country).  
"[The] goal was to force state systems to behave like [the Warren Court] assumed the FBI, 
United States attorneys, and the federal courts behaved."  Id.
 289. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 229, at 271 (describing the Court’s sense that 
aggressive rulings were in order to effectuate needed changes in the states’ criminal justice 
systems due to a lack of momentum by any other capable body); Pye, supra note 223, at 66 
(contrasting the Court’s traditionally gradual sensibilities with the impetus it sensed towards 
making radical changes to criminal procedure norms). 
 290. Pye, supra note 223, at 66. 
 291. See UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 254 (crediting the Warren Court’s ability to 
select the "right" answers generally, and within its criminal procedure cases, for its long-
standing influence); Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 802 (suggesting that current 
criminal defendants are indebted to the Revolution for many of the protections they enjoy). 
 292. See WHITE, supra note 254, at 275 (describing the Revolution as ultimately 
"making law enforcement practice more closely approximate ideals of justice and fairness"); 
UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 157 (viewing the Revolution as essentially transforming the 
Constitution into a "living document" which more closely resembled the aspirations of the 
Framers for the modern age). 
 293. Pye, supra note 223, at 67. 
 294. WHITE, supra note 254, at 265 (emphasis added).  The Warren Court considered 
the criminal justice system from the point of view of the defendant as well as the prosecutor, 
and attempted to craft decisions that balanced between their naturally conflicting interests.  
Id. at 265–66. 
 295. See Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 802 (describing the changes enforced by 
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In comparing criminal procedure reform and potential immigration 
reform, the two most striking difficulties are the questions of capacity and 
citizenship, which will be explained in turn.  First, in order to effectuate 
reform within any area of law, there must be a measure of legal capacity to 
make the reform binding.  Despite the criticisms of judicial abandon, the 
Supreme Court in carrying out the Revolution possessed legal authority 
through its historical responsibility to interpret and apply the 
Constitution.296  Additionally, this function was effectively shielded from 
popular judgment due to the Court’s unique position in the federal 
government.297  On the other hand, immigration reform must take place 
within the volatile political processes of Congress, as it is the only political 
body empowered to realize such reform.  The current legislative paralysis 
concerning immigration is testament to the structural and political obstacles 
which must be managed if immigration reform is to occur.  Simply put, the 
five votes required to perpetuate the Revolution are dwarfed by the 
hundreds of votes necessary to enact federal immigration legislation, not to 
mention the political accountability felt by each congressional member.  
Second and more troublesome, enforceable legal rights require citizenship.  
The Revolution operated on the implication that constitutional rights owed
to criminal defendants were being denied to them.298  In contrast, 
noncitizens enjoy relatively few rights and therefore often lack meaningful 
protection from essentially unconstitutional government action.299
Fortunately, the traits of the Revolution described above function as 
solutions to these difficulties and provide guidance for gaining long-term 
stability in immigration law.  As a starting point, immigration reform 
should restore the importance of the courts, which were so central to the 
Revolution.300  This can be achieved in part by restoring full habeas corpus 
                                                                                                                 
the Revolution as "necessary" and vitally important to contemporary criminal adjudications). 
 296. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218–19 (outlining the Supreme Court’s authority 
in dictating minimal standards of criminal procedural protections as it developed from the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 297. See id. (same).
 298. See Pye, supra note 223, at 67 (arguing that the Revolution fulfilled the true intent 
of the Bill of Rights, in that it provided criminal defendants with adequate mechanisms by 
which they may defend themselves from the many powers of the state). 
 299. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 154, at 485–86 (discussing the unclear due process 
rights of noncitizen respondents in deportation hearings).
 300. Id. at 66–67 (recognizing the Supreme Court’s initiative in implementing the 
Revolution "[d]espite persuasive arguments urging different action [including] the principles 
of federalism [which through the Revolution] have yielded to the desire of the Court to 
provide equal justice to the rich and the poor in state and federal criminal proceedings").  See
also Stacy Caplow, Renorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 101 (2007-2008) 
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review as discussed above and allowing the numerous federal district courts 
to become involved in immigration adjudications.301  Allowing this 
oversight of executive enforcement would encourage the federal 
immigration agencies to comply with proper procedures, and the courts 
would correct that behavior which does not conform to minimal 
standards.302  Beyond applying the statutory and regulatory law, the courts 
would also protect fundamental rights where necessary.303  Though not 
every immigrant must receive full constitutional protections, there are 
minimal rights that must be protected, such as the right to petition a court 
for habeas corpus.304  This regularization and semi-constitutionalization of 
immigration enforcement should also provide greater public faith in the 
federal immigration enforcement agencies, as it would hopefully minimize 
the more extreme enforcement practices as well as establish better 
reputations for the police and other government actors in the immigrant 
communities.305  This public goodwill would then ultimately serve to justify 
                                                                                                                 
(presenting various recommendations for Immigration Courts to ameliorate a judicial system 
that is vitally important for "people who are very worthy, who have truly suffered and been 
abandoned by their countries, or who have the right to stay in this country though time, 
stakes, contributions, and character"). 
 301. See Benson, Paper Dolls, supra note 30, at 63–64 ("Better review, at the 
administrative level and in the federal courts, enhances the quality of our legal system and 
aids the agency officials administering the law.").  Moreover, due to the burden of 
immigration appeals on the federal courts of appeals, "cases perhaps should be shifted back 
to the federal district courts in order to spread the workload among a larger number of 
judges."  Id.
 302. See id. ("The dialogue generated in the review process is one of our legal system’s 
methods of identifying problems in the law."). 
 303. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("At its historical core, the writ of 
habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it 
is in that context that its protections have been strongest.").  Though limited historically to 
legal matters, "an attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of 
the detention."  Id. at 301 n.14 (quoting Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1238 (1970)). 
 304. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 ("[T]o conclude that the writ is no longer available in 
this context would represent a departure from historical practice in immigration law. The 
writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive 
detention.").  See also Norako, supra note 124, at 1617–20 (describing the foundations of the 
writ of habeas corpus in U.S. law and its great importance to immigration law). 
 305. Cf. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 928 (2004) ("The concern behind an alien’s 
right to petition this Court for relief is a familiar one—that personal freedom can only be 
preserved when there are institutional checks on arbitrary government action.").  See also
Evans, supra note 145, at 603–10 (arguing that because immigration raids conducted within 
the U.S. are not only constitutionally questionable but also detrimental to the communities 
they strike, a change in policy is needed to monitor such enforcement practices with greater 
scrutiny). 
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the difficult political maneuverings that reestablished the courts’ role in 
immigration. 
V.  Conclusion 
Comprehensive immigration reform, if done with an eye towards the 
justifications stated for the creation of our modern immigration system, 
would not be a blind leap into radically new territory.  Rather, this type of 
historical underpinning would give reform a sturdy foundation which both 
the population and the government can recognize.  It would merely be "an 
affirmation of old principles."306  Due consideration must be given to 
current realities and there must be efforts to provide logical and forward-
looking solutions, yet any reform must also signify a commitment to past 
intentions.307  This includes those beliefs woven into the language of the 
Constitution, and in addressing immigration reform with reference to its 
underlying principles, the public memory is refreshed of these ideals.308
Mindful of the commitments made to provide a more equitable immigration 
system, Congress should decide that habeas corpus is a hallmark of all U.S. 
courts, including immigration courts.309  "We cannot boast of our 
magnificent system of law, and enact immigration legislation which 
violates decent principles of legal protection."310  This return to a firm role 
of judicial review in immigration would provide greatly needed stability, 
benefitting both future immigrants and the United States. 
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if it is a custody to which he has been remanded by the order of an inferior court of the 
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